Branded: How Mental Disorder Labels Alter Task Performance in Perception and Reality by Foy, Steven Larrimore
  
 
Branded: How Mental Disorder Labels Alter Task Performance in Perception and 
Reality    
  
by 
Steven Larrimore Foy 
Department of Sociology 
Duke University 
 
Date:_______________________ 
Approved: 
 
___________________________ 
Linda K. George, Co-Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Lynn Smith-Lovin, Co-Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Deborah T. Gold 
 
___________________________ 
Kenneth I. Spenner 
 
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy in the Department of 
Sociology in the Graduate School 
of Duke University 
 
2013 
 
 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
Branded: How Mental Disorder Labels Alter Task Performance in Perception and 
Reality     
 
by 
Steven Larrimore Foy 
Department of Sociology 
Duke University 
 
Date:_______________________ 
Approved: 
 
___________________________ 
Linda K. George, Co-Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Lynn Smith-Lovin, Co-Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Deborah T. Gold 
 
___________________________ 
Kenneth I. Spenner 
 
An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of 
Sociology in the Graduate School of 
Duke University 
 
2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Steven Larrimore Foy  
2013 
 
  iv 
 
Abstract 
Extensive evidence demonstrates how mental illness symptomatology can inhibit 
perceptions of and actual performance on important tasks.  However, receiving 
treatment from the medical establishment for such symptomatology requires diagnosis, 
whereby the patient becomes labeled and subject to the stereotypes connected to that 
label.  Mental illness labeling is associated with a variety of negative outcomes including 
inhibited access to unemployment, housing, health insurance, and marriage and 
parenthood opportunities and can disrupt interpersonal relationships.  However, the 
repercussions of mental illness labeling for one area of life have remained largely 
overlooked; that area is task performance.  Adults spend a substantial portion of their 
lives at work engaged in group-based or individual level tasks.  This dissertation 
explores external perceptions of mental illness in task groups and the role of self-
internalization of stereotypes about mental illness in individual task performance 
through two experimental studies.  
Previous research has revealed that, on average, task partners with a mental 
illness are stigmatized and subject to diminished status when they are identified to 
participants as having been hospitalized for general psychological problems for an 
extended period of time.  Study 1 of this dissertation explores the stigma- and status-
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based attributions triggered by engaging with a partner in a mutual task who is 
identified as having a specific mental illness label: none, Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD), Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD), or schizophrenia.   
Additionally, research has revealed that members of a group about which 
negative stereotypes exist may face a situational threat in a domain relevant task—
stereotype threat.  Race, gender, social class, age, and a variety of other 
sociodemographic attributes can trigger stereotype threat.  However, little research has 
considered the potential for stereotype threat to emerge on the basis of mental illness 
labeling.   Study 2 of this dissertation focuses on individual-level performance, exploring 
the potential for ADHD to trigger stereotype threat in test-taking situations. 
Results from Study 1 suggest that the specific mental illness labels studied, 
presented devoid of symptomatology severity, do not trigger stigmatized attributions 
but may trigger some negative status attributions in the case of a task relevant diagnosis. 
(ADHD).  Study 2 suggests that a task relevant diagnosis may also trigger stereotype 
threat in a test-taking situation, negatively impacting performance.  Taken together, the 
results indicate that task relevance of one’s mental illness label may be a driving factor 
in negative external and internal perceptions of mental illness.   
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1. In the Aftermath of Medicalization: Implications at the 
Intersection of Mental Health Labeling and Task 
Performance 
“Where you thought your friends were just having normal troubles, the 
developers of the American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic bible raise the 
possibility that you are surrounded by the mentally ill.  Equally disconcerting to you, 
you may be among them.” (Kutchins and Kirk 1997).   
 
An experienced malady is not inherently a medical problem; it must be defined 
as such.  Medicalization, or the process by which formerly non-medical problems 
become seen as medically treatable, continues to expand (Conrad 2007).  The deviance of 
earlier times has given way to diagnoses like alcoholism and Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).  Even widespread aspects of human existence 
once viewed as natural and largely unavoidable have become subject to medical 
attention from childbirth to menopause and erectile dysfunction (Conrad 2007).  Perhaps 
no area has proven more fertile for the seeds of medicalization than that of mental 
health. 
Prima facie, the expansion of medicalization provides several clear benefits to 
mental health patients, such as access to information about their symptomatology, 
treatment, and educational and occupational accommodations (U.S. Department of 
Justice 2009; DeSantis et al. 2008; Broom and Woodward 1996).  However, these benefits 
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often come with a cost enacted by stigma and paid in the jeopardizing of relationships, 
health, and material wealth (Link et al. 2001; Wahl 1999; Link et al. 1997; Link et al. 1991; 
Link et al. 1989; Link 1987; Sibicky and Dovidio 1986; Mor et al. 1984; Farina et al. 1971).  
This dissertation aims to extend our understanding of that cost in the context of task 
performance, or “the core technical behaviours and activities involved in [a] job” via two 
studies (Griffin, Neal, and Neale 2000).  The first study examines how knowledge of a 
task partner’s mental illness label impacts one’s perceptions of the partner’s 
performance in a task group situation.  The second study considers how one’s personal 
performance on a task is impacted by awareness of the stereotypes surrounding his or 
her own mental illness label.   
This chapter sets the stage, providing an overview of the medicalization of 
mental illness, describing some of the benefits and downsides to being labeled as 
mentally ill, and demonstrating the need for research on the impact of mental health 
labeling in the specific area of task performance.  Additionally, this chapter presents the 
organization of the manuscript. 
1.1 Medicalizing Mental Illness 
 The traditional biomedical approach to mental illness was rooted in the idea that 
problems can be identified via molecular biology and diagnosed, primarily to the 
exclusion of social and environmental factors (Fava and Sonino 2008).  Critics, including, 
most notably, George Engel (1977), successfully advocated for a more inclusive model 
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that conceptualized illness as the confluence of “interacting mechanisms at the cellular, 
tissue, organismic, interpersonal, and environmental levels” (Fava and Sonino 2008:1).  
Combining science with humanism, this biopsychosocial model took hold as the major 
organizing principle of American psychiatry from World War II until the mid-1970s 
(Wilson 1993).  Psychoanalysis became the guiding theory and psychotherapy the most 
common treatment.  The American Psychiatric Association’s 1952 Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders I (DSM-I) and 1968 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
II (DSM-II) described symptoms as symbols of people’s personal histories—reactions to 
challenging life events.  Moreover, leading psychiatrists like Karl Menninger argued that 
separating mental disorders along symptom profiles was a faulty approach given that 
mental disorders could be reduced to the extent to which individuals were able to adapt 
to their environments (Mayes and Horwitz 2005). 
However, the traditional biomedical model proved to be resilient, returning to 
prominence in the American Psychiatric Association’s 1980 Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders-III (Blacker and Tsuang 1999).  By this point, criticism from 
within and without the medical establishment of psychoanalysis and the 
biopsychosocial model had led to a “crisis of legitimacy” for psychiatry (Mayes and 
Horwitz 2005:249).  The DSM-III represented a restorative moment.  Based on extensive 
field trials, the DSM-III was regarded as more objective and logical; as Jerrold Maxmen 
(1985:31) put it, “the old psychiatry derives from theory, the new psychiatry from fact” 
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(First 2010).  As such, this version of the DSM received approval from American medical 
schools, the National Institute of Mental Health, and other institutions which had failed 
to embrace previous DSMs (Mayes and Horwitz 2005). 
The DSM-III provided psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, counselors, 
providers of financial reimbursement (such as insurance companies and the 
government), and the general public with common definitions for diagnosable mental 
disorders for the first time.  With the common language of the DSM-III, clinical research 
boomed as researchers were able to more easily satisfy governmental demands for the 
use of standardized scientific criteria in grant proposals.  Further, the DSM-III’s focus on 
symptomatology and pharmacological treatment ushered in a new dawn for 
pharmaceutical companies which set to work providing remedies for newly diagnosed 
mental disorders (Mayes and Horwitz 2005).  Medicalization expanded even further 
with the DSM-IV; for example, grief, once considered normal for up to a year after 
bereavement in the DSM-III, was presented as problematic after just 2 months according 
to the DSM-IV.  The solution presented?  Antidepressants (Walton 2012).   
Medicalization continues to rise at: 1) the conceptual level, whereby medical 
vocabulary is extending to encompass more and more of human experience; 2) the 
institutional level, wherein medical personnel make treatment decisions; and 3) the 
interactional level, where physicians treat patients (Conrad 2007; Conrad and Schneider 
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1980).1  More than this, however, medicalization is continually reified in everyday 
interactions between the medically labeled and the non-medically labeled and in the 
interactions that the medically labeled have with institutions designed to accommodate 
them.  What does all of this rising medicalization mean for those who are subject to it?  
Like any tool, it has the potential to build or to deface, to create or to destroy.  It is to this 
duality that we now turn.   
1.2 The Potential Benefits of Medicalization 
Medicalization offers a number of potential benefits.  For example, those 
diagnosed with a mental disorder have recourse to a professional explanation for their 
non-normative experiences; as Conrad and Potter (2000:103) note, “Life’s troubles are 
often confusing, distressing, debilitating, and difficult to understand.”  A diagnosis 
presents an opportunity to comprehend some of the previously inexplicable events 
which may have befallen the patient due to his or her symptomatology.2  The patient 
may see the application of a medical definition to his or her particular sets of experiences 
and behaviors as a welcome validation of the legitimacy of his or her struggles (Broom 
and Woodward 1996).  A diagnosis allows one to stand with the full (or at least partial, 
                                                     
1 It should be noted that forces of demedicalization are also at play for certain aspects of human experience 
(Halfmann 2012). 
2 However, access to and successful application of such information is much less contingent on face-to-face 
interactions with medical professionals than it once was given the rise of patient knowledge and advocacy 
(Conrad and Leiter 2004). 
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in the case of contested diagnoses) weight of the medical establishment behind one’s 
claims of difficulty or distress.   
Additionally, with a diagnosis, persons with a mental disorder may also have 
access to the expertise of health care providers regarding treatment options for their 
problematic symptoms as well as the medicinal resources to combat those symptoms.  
One may not legally obtain certain forms of treatment without a diagnosis.  In the case 
of ADHD, for example, many of the more effective medications, including Adderall, 
Ritalin, and Dexedrine, are only available via prescription due to their classification as 
Schedule II substances by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
(DeSantis et al. 2008).   
Aside from treatment, a diagnosis offers the opportunity to obtain educational 
and occupational accommodations or protection against discrimination under anti-
discrimination laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (U. S. 
Department of Justice 2009).  The United States’ Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) (2008) notes that any American with “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” “a record (or past 
history) of such an impairment” or “being regarded as having a disability” may qualify 
for accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  The courts have 
established a number of mental health-related symptoms as capable of validating 
substantial limitation to major life activities including cognitive functioning in general 
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and, more specifically, concentrating and remembering (Brown v. Cox 2002; Gagliardo 
v. Connaught Laboratories, Inc. 2002).  The accommodations thereby available may 
afford persons with mental disorders the opportunity to perform at a level reasonably 
commensurate with that of their non-affected peers.  For those whose mental disorders 
render them incapable of working, a diagnosis legitimates the receipt of benefits from 
the Social Security Administration (SSA).  In fact, among those receiving SSA benefits, 
people with psychiatric disabilities comprise the largest and fastest-growing group 
(Drake et al. 2009). 
1.3 The Potentially Negative Aspects of Medicalized Labeling 
No matter how useful the benefits of medicalization or how well-intentioned the 
efforts of health care practitioners, however, those who diagnose may be exposing their 
patients to stigmatization by labeling them as persons with mental disorders, attributes 
that are “deeply discrediting” (Link et al. 1989; Goffman 1963:3).  Indeed, many of the 
earliest social scientific writings on medicalization were critiques of psychiatry (Conrad 
2005).  Earlier studies suggested that the stigmatizing label of “mental patient” can 
function as an “engulfing role” (Schur 1971) or “master status” (Becker 1963), remaining 
lodged in the minds of others as a persistently relevant part of oneself.  Persons with 
mental health conditions report negativity from members of their families, churches, and 
broader communities, facing stigmatization even from the medical professionals who 
treat them (Wahl 1999; Penn and Martin 1998; Angermeyer and Matschinger 1997; Wolff 
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et al. 1996; Hamre et al. 1994; Brockington et al. 1993; Monahan 1992).  Views of the 
mentally ill as dangerous and prone to unexpected behaviors, in particular, are common 
(Wahl 1995; Link and Stueve 1994; Dubin and Fink 1992; Monahan 1992). 
This is not to suggest that views of widespread negativity toward those labeled 
as mentally ill are uncontested.  A number of scholars have disputed the notion that the 
stigma of mental health patients is pervasive while others have suggested that, if 
stigmatization does result from mental disorder, then it is a reaction to deviant behavior 
rather than to a stigmatizing label (Gove 1975; Lehman et al. 1976; Crocetti et al. 1974).  
However, many such claims have been refuted by research revealing the widespread 
stigmatization brought on by mental illness even when mental health labels are present 
but aberrant behavior is not (Monahan 1992; Link et al. 1987). 
Mental illness labeling has material effects, leading to inhibited access to 
employment (Link 1987; Link 1982), housing (Mor et al. 1984; Page 1977), and health 
insurance (Saban and Daniels 1994).  Additionally, mental illness can also inhibit 
marriage and parenthood opportunities (Link et al. 1991) and disrupts interpersonal 
relationships (Sibicky and Dovidio 1986; Farina et al. 1971; Farina et al. 1968).  When 
one’s mental disorder becomes known, he or she tends to more frequently avoid and be 
avoided by others socially (Martin et al. 2007; Phelan 2005; Corrigan et al. 2003; Wright 
et al. 2000). Furthermore, the mentally ill report disappointment, pain, and anger as a 
result of such stigmatization and experience anxiety, diminished self-esteem, and 
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depression (Link et al. 2001; Wahl 1999; Link et al. 1997; Link 1987; Farina 1981).3  While 
it is clear that medicalized labeling may be responsible for many negative effects, the 
impact of such labeling in task performance circumstances remains substantially more 
ambiguous.   
1.4 Medicalized Labeling in Task Performance Scenarios 
 Students subject to compulsory education in the United States spend 
approximately 180 days per year in school in most states (Education Commission of the 
States 2011).  The average employed American spends 1787 hours working each year 
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2013).  Education and 
employment involve the perpetual completion of tasks, the success or failure of which 
determines the quality and longevity of one’s educational or vocational experiences.  
Although recent research has examined the role of medicalization in the workplace and 
in education, knowledge of how specific mental illness labels impact perceived and 
actual adult performance in educational and vocational contexts remains limited 
(Conrad 2007).  This is true at both the group and individual levels of analysis. 
                                                     
3 Mental illness in these studies typically reflects diagnosis label (e.g., Link et al. 2001; Link et al. 1997; Link 
et al. 1991; Link 1987; Link 1982; Link 1977; Page 1977), although some focus specifically on history of 
hospitalization (e.g., Mor et al. 1984) or history of psychological therapy (e.g., Sibicky and Dovidio 1986). 
Overall, however, being labeled as a person with a mental illness is sufficient in and of itself to subject one 
to a variety of negative outcomes. 
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1.4.1 Group Level 
Early social psychologists focused primarily on questions concerning group 
performance, as many tasks are performed in social settings.  Some tasks are seen as 
impossible for an individual to manage or requiring a diversity of knowledge to handle 
(Hackman and Morris 1975).  Working in groups also may also diminish mistakes as 
more eyes are on the task.4  The efficiency and effectiveness of organizations is directly 
attributable to the success or failure of the work groups embedded within them (Kravitz 
and Martin 1986; Paulus 1983; Lewin, Lippitt, and White 1939; Sherif 1936; Shaw 1932; 
Ringelman 1913).   
Groups working toward mutual goals vary widely in efficacy based on a number 
of factors (Gladstein 1984; Newton and Levinson 1973).  Levels of cooperation and 
discussion influence productivity (Komorita and Parks 1995; Sally 1995).  So too does the 
degree of familiarity among group members (Jehn and Shah 1997). 
Crucial to the internal dynamics of groups are the features of their members and 
the idiosyncrasies of their heterogeneous socio-demographic profiles.  Managing diverse 
work groups is one of the most challenging aspects of maintaining a successful 
organization (Tsui and Gutek 1999).  Conventional research on diversity within work 
groups revealed the impact of age, sex, race, ethnicity, and other relatively overt 
                                                     
4 However, on the other hand, many social psychologists argue that group interaction leads to “social 
loafing” (e.g., Karau and Williams 1993; Ingham et al. 1974; Ringelman 1913) or “process losses,” which 
impede overall productivity (Hackman and Morris 1975:47). 
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“surface-level” or “high-visibility” factors on performance (Williams and O’Reilly 1998; 
Pelled 1996; Jackson, May, and Whitney 1995).  For example, age differences within 
groups are negatively associated with within-team functioning, leading to reduced 
cohesion, diminished communication, higher turnover, and social isolation of group 
members (Kirchmeyer 1995; Jackson et al. 1991; O’Reilly et al. 1989; Zenger and 
Lawrence 1989).  More recently, scholars have turned their attention to “deep-level” 
factors that distinguish members from each other, such as personality traits, values, 
attitudes, preferences, and beliefs (Barsade et al. 2000; Harrison, Price, and Bell 1998; 
Jehn, Chadwick, and Thatcher 1997). 
Medicalized mental health conditions often function as deep-level factors.  Like 
personality traits or preferences, they tend to emerge from their initial latency through 
interaction (Harrison et al. 2002).  Over time, patterns of behavior, exchanges of 
confidence, or even Facebook postings reveal more about medicalized mental health 
conditions, bringing them to the surface (Martin et al. 2012).  However, our knowledge 
of how specific mental health labels are viewed in task groups remains limited.  Given 
that knowledge of one’s mental illness can result in interpersonal disruptions, mental 
illnesses nonetheless vary dramatically in severity across diagnosis types. Thus, 
understanding the differential effects of mental health labeling on group dynamics 
remains important (Martin et al. 2007; Phelan 2005; Sibicky and Dovidio 1986; Farina et 
al. 1971; Farina et al. 1968).   
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1.4.2 Individual Level 
 Success is not always a product of group initiative.  From driving a car to taking 
a standardized test, some tasks require individual effort alone.  As with group level task 
performance, many factors influence task performance at the individual level, including 
the extent to which one multitasks and one’s conscientiousness, need achievement, locus 
of control, level of anxiety, and self-esteem (Shao and Shao 2012; Gellatly 1996; Eysenck 
1985).  Individual task performance is also tied to one’s knowledge, psychomotor 
abilities, and attentional resources (Sonnentag and Frese 2002). 
 What then is the impact of mental illness labeling on individual task 
performance?  Beyond the symptomatology of the condition underlying a mental illness 
label, external perceptions of what that label entails—fueled by stereotypes and 
prejudices—can create a detrimental environment for those who are labeled.  Public 
stigma, having been observed at the individual level, can, in turn, be internalized as self-
stigma.  Dwelling on self-stigma could potentially interfere with one’s performance of 
everyday tasks (Drapalski et al. 2013; Corrigan and Watson 2002).  However, evidence is 
limited as to the extent to which self-stigma resulting from mental health labeling 
impacts measurable task performance at the individual level.  
1.4.3 The Present Studies 
This dissertation moves beyond previous investigations of the detriments of 
medicalized labeling to explore the potentially adverse effects of carrying such a label 
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both at the group level (in interactions with group members in the performance of a 
shared task) and at the individual level (in test-taking performance) through two 
experimental studies.  Extending previous research which demonstrated the negative 
attributions directed at task partners with a history of hospitalization for psychological 
problems, Study 1 focuses on differentiation across specific medicalized labels (Lucas 
and Phelan 2012).  Lucas and Phelan (2012) found evidence that mental illness triggered 
stigmatizing feedback from participants as well as attributions of lower status, 
indicating that mental illness may not just be stigmatized but may also represent a status 
characteristic.  Status characteristics are organizing principles within social systems 
consisting of hierarchical states (such as, for example, “gender” with its states of “male” 
and “female”).  However, in gauging perceptions of mental illness in task groups, Lucas 
and Phelan considered only a small range of differentiation within mental illness 
(previously hospitalized for 12 months or not).  Study 1 proceeds from the standpoint 
that stigma and status perceptions differ across more nuanced states of mental illness 
than hospitalization status.  
 Specifically, Study 1 seeks to answer the following question: 1) To what extent 
do specific mental illness diagnoses alter perceptions of task group partners in terms of 
stigma and status?  In other words, when behavioral indicators and information about 
treatment history are unavailable, to what extent do differing mental illness labels 
themselves drive attributions of stigma and status in work groups?  If substantial 
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perceptional differences exist between diagnoses, then treating mental illness more 
monolithically may obscure important details in how people with mental illnesses are 
perceived in workgroups to the detriment of productivity.  For example, if participants 
typically view persons with Diagnosis A as being of low status yet do not stigmatize 
against them and typically view persons with Diagnosis B as being of equal or higher 
status to themselves but as highly stigmatized, then interventions to maximize 
workplace cooperation and efficiency would need to address these diagnoses 
differently.  Study 1 considers potential differentiation between perceptions of 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and schizophrenia.   
Study 2 moves from group level perceptions to self-stigma and its impact on 
individual level performance.  Others’ stigmatizing views of oneself can be internalized 
to detrimental effect (e.g., Drapalski et al. 2013; Kroska and Harkness 2008; Hinshaw 
2007).  One way in which this occurs is through stereotype threat, or the fear of 
confirming a stereotype about a personally-relevant group identification (Steele 1997).  
Research confirms that stereotype threat diminishes test-taking performance among 
African Americans (Blascovich et al. 2001; McKay et al. 2002; Mayer and Hanges 2003), 
West Indians (Deaux et al. 2007), and Latinas (Gonzales et al. 2002) as well as among 
women (regardless of race) (Spencer et al. 1999; Quinn and Spencer 2001; O’Brien and 
Crandall 2003) and among individuals from low socioeconomic (SES) backgrounds 
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(Croizet and Claire 1998; Spencer and Castano 2007) as well as on a number of other 
bases.  However, social scientists have yet to evaluate the impact of stereotype threat on 
adults labeled with a task-relevant mental disorder.  Study 2 explores whether 
stereotype threat invoked on the basis of having ADHD impedes test-taking 
performance.   
Previous research found evidence that stereotype threat may emerge on the basis 
of depression but not eating disorders (Quinn et al. 2004).  Thus, it appears that some 
mental disorders may trigger stereotype threat while others may not.  This study focuses 
on the following research question: can a task-relevant mental disorder form the basis 
for stereotype threat?  More specifically, when the symptomatology of a mental illness is 
directly related to a task such that it would be expected to inhibit performance, can the 
label associated with that illness reduce task success separately of the illness’ 
symptomatology via stereotype threat?  ADHD’s symptomatology includes a number of 
facets relevant to test-taking, such as being distracted by extraneous stimuli or failing to 
follow directions (Educational Testing Service 2008).   
1.5 Organization of the Manuscript 
Studies 1 and 2 provide insight into two different types of perception (external 
and internal) situated at two important points in the road to productive adulthood (test-
taking, a precursor to educational attainment, and task group participation, a key 
component of occupational success).  Chapter 2 details the first study, exploring 
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participants’ status-based and stigma-based reactions to a task partner with different 
mental illness labels in the performance of a shared task.  Chapter 3 focuses on the 
second study, featuring the first known test of whether a domain-relevant mental illness 
label can invoke stereotype threat.  Chapter 4 concludes the dissertation, summarizing 
its key findings, noting limitations, and providing suggestions for future research.  
Altogether, the project provides perceptual measures and performance-based measures 
designed to uncover the potential limitations and detriments posed by efforts to 
improve the lives of the mentally disabled through diagnosis and labeling.   
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2. Clinically-Categorized Cross-Cubicle Conflict?: How 
Mental Disorder Labels Alter Perceptions of Task 
Partners (Study 1) 
“These people go to work, but they’re the working wounded.” –Joseph 
Calabrese, Professor of Psychiatry (Armour 2006). 
 
Employed Americans spend approximately 7.6 hours working on each day that 
they work (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011).  In 2011, as the average hours worked for 
developed nations fell on average, they rose in the United States to 34.5 hours per week 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2012). Moreover, work is an 
important component of identity and a major determinant of mental health (Stuart 2006; 
Hulin 2002).  Given the centrality of work in Americans’ lives, maintaining a hospitable 
work environment is important, particularly since workplace incivility may represent a 
veiled manifestation of discrimination on the basis of specific sociodemographic 
categories.   
Though desired and attempted, workplace civility, (which includes working 
hard on team projects, accepting responsibility for blame, and avoiding disrespect and 
condescension among other factors), is hardly guaranteed (Forni et al. 2003; Cortina et 
al. 2001).  Forty-three percent of Americans report that they have experienced incivility 
at work, with 20% quitting a job as a result (Weber Shandwick, Powell Tate, and KRC 
Research 2012; Weber Shandwick, Powell Tate, and KRC Research 2011).  Studies 
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focused on a variety of vocational arenas capture the tenuousness of maintaining 
concord in the workplace; for example, two-thirds of respondents to a study of members 
of a southeastern state bar association reported incivility as a growing problem in their 
profession (Wegner 1996).  Similarly, new graduate nurses note the routine 
discourteousness of senior nurses (Laschinger, Finegan, and Wilk 2009).  In other 
samples, 71% of court employees (Cortina et al. 2001), 75% of university employees 
(Cortina 2008), and 79% of law enforcement (Cortina 2008) reported incivility in their 
professions in recent years.  
The consequences of workplace incivility resonate beyond the immediate 
discomfort it generates.  Incivility breeds retaliatory incivility which can escalate to 
coercion and violence (Kain 2008; Andersson and Pearson 1999).  Ongoing workplace 
incivility can also be detrimental to both individual and organizational performance 
(Estes and Wang 2008; Cortina 2008; Cortina et al. 2001).  In uncivil work environments, 
workers tend to have lower creativity, stop asking for help, hide their errors, avoid 
letting each other know about potential problems, lose concentration, and are less 
willing to expend discretionary effort (Pearson and Porath 2009; Cortina 2008; Sutton 
2007).  Targets of workplace incivility tend to arrive at work later and leave earlier or 
take additional time off to avoid difficult situations (Pearson et al. 2005).  Moreover, the 
discomfort generated by workplace incivility can trigger stress-related mental and 
physical health problems that reduce productivity (e.g., depression, anxiety, ulcers, and 
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migraines) (Baba, Jamal, and Tourigny 1998; Adams 1988).  Ultimately, incivility in the 
workplace can lead workers to lose commitment to their organizations and quit (Cortina 
2008). 
Recent scholarship posits that incivility in organizations may simply be thinly-
veiled categorical discrimination—a product of prejudicial perceptions of one’s co-
workers.  Cortina (2008) describes how blatant attempts to discriminate against women 
and minorities in the workplace has become increasingly less socially acceptable, yet 
day-to-day acts of incivility allow such discrimination to continue more subtly.  
Everyday incivility can often be explained away as the result of misunderstanding, 
accident, oversight, or personality, and intent can be difficult to prove.   
As with race and gender, mental health diagnoses may constitute another basis 
for workplace incivility overlaying deeper issues of prejudice and attempting to explain 
away serious forms of discrimination.   Although people recognize that societal norms 
direct them to be accepting of people with mental disorders, they also report belief that 
most other people view the mentally ill negatively.  This may represent a method of 
deflecting personal negative attributions onto society writ large while outwardly 
conforming to expectations of what is socially acceptable (Hinshaw 2007; Link and 
Cullen 1983).  However it is also true that mental illness is highly rejected in most 
societal contexts, being viewed more similarly to prostitution, drug addiction, and ex-
convict status than to having a physical illness like cancer or heart disease (Albrecht, 
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Walker, and Levy 1982; Tringo 1970).  What remains unclear is how specific mental 
illness labels are perceived within task groups.  Given the importance of well-
functioning task groups to the success of organizations and the difficulty of managing 
heterogeneous work groups, this area of diversity demands attention (Tsui and Gutek 
1999)  To what extent, then, do stigma and status attributions differ across mental illness 
types in settings in which incivility may hamper the performance goals of an 
organization? 
Stigma and status—two interrelated but distinctly developed means of 
determining how social categories pattern unequal interpersonal outcomes—each 
provide useful approaches for understanding prejudicial perceptions (Lucas and Phelan 
2012).  This study explores how representing a partner as having a mental health label 
impacts participants’ stigma-based and status-based perceptions of a partner in 
intergroup task scenarios.  A previously overlooked line of inquiry, understanding 
perceptions of stigma and status in the context of task groups working toward a 
common cause may help clarify the extent to which medicalization has complicated 
perceptions of the mentally ill in the workplace.  To clarify the theoretical contribution 
that this study offers to sociological knowledge, I turn to a discussion of stigma and 
status and their relevance to workplace perceptions of those diagnosed as mentally ill. 
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2.1 Theoretical Background 
2.1.1 Stigma and Mental Illness 
 In 1999, then-U.S. Surgeon General David Satcher identified stigma as “the most 
formidable obstacle to future progress in the arena of mental illness and mental health” 
(Hinshaw 2007:x).  Despite the fact that knowledge of mental illness has increased in the 
U.S., severe forms of mental disorder face higher stigma now than ever (Hinshaw 2007).  
Although there is variability in conceptualizations of stigma, one of the more widely 
accepted ones was proposed by Erving Goffman (1963).  He describes stigma as an 
“attribute that is deeply discrediting,” reducing the stigmatized individual from “a 
whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (Goffman 1963:3).  Goffman (1963) 
identifies three characteristic types susceptible to stigmatization: 1) physical deformities 
(e.g., having a cleft palate, being overweight, having a handicap); 2) “tribal” 
characteristics that differ from those in power (e.g., race, nationality, religion); and 3) 
blemishes of character (e.g., radical political behavior, suicidal tendencies, or 
homosexuality).  Extensions from Goffman characterize stigma alternatively as being 
characteristic of those who violate social norms (Crocker et al. 1998) or convey attributes 
of a social identity devalued in a particular social context (Stafford and Scott 1986).   
 Link and Phelan (2001) provide a useful synopsis of the stigma process, 
describing its production via four components.  They argue that people: 1) distinguish 
and label differences; 2) associate these differences with negative attributes; and 3) 
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categorize labeled persons in such a way as to create a “them” category separated from 
“us,” (the unlabeled).  Through this process, the labeled then become 4) exposed to 
status loss and discrimination.   
Mental illness has long been viewed as consistent with these criteria and, in fact, 
has served as a catalyst for modification of scholarly understandings of stigma.  
Goffman (1963) provided mental illness as an example of a blemish of character (one of 
his three bases for stigma).  Scheff (1966) proposed that deviance is labeled as mental 
illness by society, leading the deviant to then enact behaviors consistent with the label in 
a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Objections to the evidentiary basis for Scheff’s (1966) claim led 
Link (1982, 1987) to develop modified labeling theory, which removed the suggestion 
that labeling caused mental illness.  Modified labeling theory explained how, when 
people become diagnosed with mental illnesses, cultural stereotypes about mental 
illness (such as, for example, dangerous or incompetence) become personally relevant to 
them and result in expectations that others will react negatively to them (Link 1987; Link 
1982).  As a result, those labeled with mental illness conceal their diagnoses and 
withdraw from social situations in order to avoid rejection.  In so doing, however, they 
isolate themselves in a manner that makes them more vulnerable to rejection.   
 However, the level of potential rejection faced by persons with mental illness 
may not apply uniformly across diagnosis types.  In their elaboration on stigma, Jones 
and colleagues (1984) identify 6 factors which could influence differential perceptions 
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across mental illness labels, including: 1) concealability (how visible or hidden the 
stigmatized characteristic is); 2) course (how the characteristic changes over time); 3) 
disruptiveness (the extent to which the characteristic disrupts social relations);  4) 
aesthetics (the extent to which the characteristic impacts bodily presentation; 5) origin 
(how the characteristic became devalued and how controllable it is); and 5) peril (how 
dangerous the characteristic is).  Applying these criteria to mental illness labels, 
differences frequently emerge.  For example, regarding origin, Link et al. (1999) found, 
in a vignette experiment, most respondents blamed alcohol dependence on the way 
people were raised, whereas most respondents saw a chemical imbalance in the brain as 
the cause for schizophrenia and major depression.  The same study provides an example 
of differences in perceived peril across illness categories; respondents saw people with 
schizophrenia as more dangerous than persons with major depression. 
 The Stereotype Content Model (SCM) sheds further light on how stigma may 
differentially apply across mental health conditions (Fiske et al. 2000).  This model is 
based on the premise that some groups solicit antipathy while others invoke 
ambivalence based on perceptions of their competence and warmth.  Research on SCM 
has revealed that people with schizophrenia, for example, may be seen as less competent 
and less warm than people with depression or an anxiety disorder (Sadler, Meagor, and 
Kaye 2012). 
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2.1.2 Status Characteristics Theory and Mental Illness 
In addition to stigma, differential perceptions of status may drive negative 
conceptualizations of partners in task groups.  To a greater extent than in the stigma 
literature, the status literature tends to be singularly guided—in this case, by status 
characteristics theory (Lucas and Phelan 2012).  Societal power and prestige 
hierarchically align with a continuum of states for any given status characteristic.  A 
status characteristic, such as age, sex, or race, represents “an organizing principle of 
social systems” about which differentiation occurs, while states constitute the levels of 
hierarchy within a status characteristic (Webster, Jr. and Hysom 1998:351).  For example, 
within the status characteristic of “gender” are the states of “male” and “female.” 
“Male” represents a state typically accorded greater power and prestige within 
American society than the state of “female” (Eagly et al. 1992; Carli 1991).  This sort of 
differentiation is thought to account for distinctions in one’s expectations of others’ task 
performance abilities (Wagner and Berger 1993). 
Status characteristics theory “seeks to explain how beliefs about status 
characteristics get translated into performance expectations, which in turn shape the 
behaviors of individuals in a group” (Correll and Ridgeway 2003:33).  According to the 
theory, when actors come together to complete a common task, they take note of 
discernible status differentiation.  In doing so, they make assumptions about themselves 
and their fellow task partners based on their expectations concerning how well each 
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person should perform who inhabits each state on a given status characteristic or set of 
status characteristics (Wagner and Berger 1993:28).  High status individuals are typically 
expected to perform more effectively than low status individuals, and these expectations 
reinforce how highly members of a given state of a status characteristic are valued 
within a task group (Lucas and Phelan 2012).  Status differentiation may emanate from 
inhabiting different states on a number of status characteristics including—but not 
limited to—race, gender, education, task ability, physical attractiveness, age, and even 
dialect (Lucas and Phelan 2012; Hopcroft 2002; Webster, Jr. and Hysom 1998; Wagner 
and Berger 1993; Eagly et al. 1992; Carli 1991). 
Given that stigmatization leads to status loss (Lucas and Phelan 2001), 
perceptions of status may be interconnected with stigma.  Although researchers have 
used status characteristics theory to explain differences in perceptions of task partners’ 
performances given those partners’ states on a number of status characteristics, medical 
diagnosis status remains unexplored in previously published research.  As Lucas and 
Phelan (2012) argue, “…no research in the status characteristics program has tested for 
status effects of mental illness” (19).   
Lucas and Phelan (2012) attempted to address this gap in the literature with 
experiments addressing the stigma and status-based perceptions surrounding 
education, mental illness, physical disability, and task ability.  To measure perceptions 
of mental illness, participants first completed 25 computer-based problems in which 
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they determined which of two rectangles that were roughly equally shaded or unshaded 
was the most shaded.  They did so in partnership with an individual (simulated by the 
computer) who either had no recorded history of mental illness or who had been 
hospitalized for 12 months for “psychological problems.”  For each problem, the 
participant chose an answer, saw their fictitious partner’s answer, and then gave a final 
answer, with the partner disagreeing for 20 out of the 25 problems.   Participants then 
had the option to sign up for the second half of the study in which they chose a topic to 
discuss in a two-person group.  Availability was limited such that participants could 
only sign up to work with their previous partner or with another anonymous partner.  
Lucas and Phelan (2012) measured stigma based on social distance (defined by the 
proportion of participants in each condition who agreed to work with the same partner 
again) and status based on the partner’s influence (defined by the number of times that, 
seeing the partner’s answer, the participant chose to change his or her answer).   
Lucas and Phelan (2012) found mental illness to be associated with lower 
influence and greater social distance.  Their findings indicate that having a history of 
mental disorder results in stigma-based and status-based negative perceptions of one’s 
intergroup task performance.  However, having a mental disorder, in the context of 
Lucas and Phelan’s (2012:12) study was represented only by a variable with noteworthy 
limitations: having been hospitalized for 12 months for unspecified “psychological 
problems.”  The length of hospitalization suggests very serious mental distress, while 
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the general label of “psychological problems” provides insufficient information to 
determine what kind of psychological problems afflicted the partner (Lucas and Phelan 
2012).  Given what we know about the extent to which states within a status 
characteristic are hierarchical, it stands to reason that specific mental disorder diagnoses 
would differ in terms of the status and stigma expectations accorded to them by 
participants in task groups (Wagner and Berger 1993).  However, evidence from surveys 
and vignette studies indicates significant differences in how mental health diagnoses 
differ from one another: for example, in a survey of undergraduates, Mann and 
Himelein 2004 found schizophrenia to be generally more stigmatizing than depression.  
However, Link and colleagues (1999) found, in a vignette study, that more respondents 
to the 1996 General Social Survey attributed major depressive disorder to one’s own bad 
character than schizophrenia.   
The present study is procedurally similar to Lucas and Phelan’s (2010) work on 
mental illness-based stigma and status attributions except insofar as its conditions focus 
on specific mental health diagnoses without mention of the task partner’s treatment 
history.  In other words, this study does not indicate that the partner was hospitalized 
for the mental disorder in any condition.  The focus remains on the medicalized label 
rather than on the severity of condition implied by hospitalization. 
The present study incorporates four mental disorder designations: Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD), Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), Attention 
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Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and schizophrenia.  GAD is included as 
representative of anxiety disorders and is characterized by excessive worry even when 
there is no apparent reason for it, difficulty sleeping, muscle tension, irritability, and a 
number of other related symptoms (National Institute of Mental Health 2009).  Anxiety 
disorders comprise the most prevalent class of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-IV 
(DSM-IV) disorders; 28.8% of those diagnosed with a DSM-IV disorder at some point 
during their lifetimes will be diagnosed with an anxiety disorder (Kessler et al. 2005).  Its 
degree of impairment and disability is considerable even without a co-morbid diagnosis 
and comparable to that of MDD (Wittchen 2002).  Research indicates an association 
between GAD and substantial economic costs resulting from lost work productivity and 
high use of medical resources (Hoffman, Dukes, and Wittchen 2008).   
Major depressive disorder, which indicates prolonged sadness with the potential 
to stifle one’s ability to perform everyday tasks, finds a place in the study as the most 
prevalent lifetime disorder in the DSM-IV.  It is also the leading cause of disability 
among Americans between the ages of 15 and 44 (National Institute of Mental Health 
2010; Kessler et al. 2005).  For these reasons, it is also included in the study. 
Characterized by inattention, compulsiveness, hyperactivity, and recklessness, 
ADHD is included in the study, as it is the most common mental disorder found in 
children and adolescents and may continue into adulthood (National Institute of Mental 
Health 2010; Kessler et al. 2006).    Finally, schizophrenia is included, as schizophrenia 
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disorders are the most common forms of mental illness after anxiety disorders and 
mood disorders (such as depression) (Zuckerman et al. 1993).  Additionally, 
schizophrenia is one of the leading worldwide causes of disability (Brundtland 2000).  
All of the included mental disorders have been documented as stigmatizing to at least 
some degree (Alonso et al. 2008; Barney et al. 2006; Angermeyer and Matschinger 2004; 
Davies 2000; Dickerson et al. 2002; Sims 1993). 
2.2 Hypotheses 
As has already been established, having a mental disorder can invite a great deal 
of stigma (Wahl 1999; Penn and Martin 1998; Angermeyer and Matschinger 1997; Wolff 
et al. 1996; Wahl 1995; Hamre et al. 1994; Brockington et al. 1993; Dubin and Fink 1992; 
Monahan 1992; Link et al. 1989; Schur 1971; Becker 1963).  Given this stigma and Lucas 
and Phelan’s (2012) findings of stigma effects for mental illness broadly construed as 
hospitalization within the last twelve months for psychological problems, I hypothesize 
that: 
Hypothesis 1: Participants will have more stigmatizing views of partners 
identified as having a mental disorder than those who are not. 
While having a mental disorder is not seen as automatically indicating an 
inability to make decisions effectively, it does call into question decision-making 
capacity (Grisso and Appelbaum 1991).  In more serious cases, skepticism about the 
impact of having a mental disorder on one’s faculties of reason even leads to medical 
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professionals restricting or taking away a patient’s opportunities to make decisions via 
hospitalization (Brakel 1985).  Ultimately, it is difficult to know from cursory interaction 
with a person with a mental health diagnosis whether that person will be capable of 
making decisions at the level required of the average person without a medical disorder.  
In fact, as Grisso and Appelbaum (1991) and Grisso (1986) attest, two people with the 
same diagnosis can vary widely in terms of functional ability.  Being cognizant of the 
skepticism directed toward the decision-making capacity of persons with a mental 
disorder and considering Lucas and Phelan’s (2012) findings of status effects for mental 
illness broadly construed as hospitalization within the last twelve months for 
psychological problems, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: Participants will attribute lower status to task partners identified 
as having a mental disorder than task partners who are not. 
Focusing on stigma, Hypothesis 1 regards expected differences in social distance 
(based on willingness to participate with the same partner in the future), judgments 
about how much the participant has in common with the partner, and attributions of the 
partner’s considerateness, pleasantness, power, likeability, and cooperativeness.  
Hypothesis 2 focuses on status and regards a partner’s influence on the participant to 
change his or her answers on the collaborative contrast sensitivity task and attributions 
of the partner’s competence, skill, respectability, knowledge, leadership, capability, and 
hard work as well as the group’s success. 
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Although Generalized Anxiety Disorder, ADHD, major depressive disorder, and 
schizophrenia all invite potential stigma (Alonso et al. 2008; Barney et al. 2006; 
Angermeyer and Matschinger 2004; Davies 2000; Dickerson et al. 2002; Sims 1993), as a 
“severe mental illness,” schizophrenia is particularly off-putting (Penn and Martin 
1998:235).  In one vignette study, respondents demonstrated more stigmatizing views of 
schizophrenics than persons suffering from major depressive disorder (Mann and 
Himelein 2004).  Specifically, schizophrenics are often assumed to be unpredictable or 
dangerous; Crisp and colleagues (2000) found that two-thirds of their respondents saw 
people with schizophrenia as dangerous even though dangerous behavior among 
schizophrenics is infrequent.  This opprobrium of schizophrenics can lead to tragic 
outcomes.  Druss and colleagues (2000) found that schizophrenics received less optimal 
treatment for heart attacks than persons without schizophrenia regardless of the 
availability of optimal treatment procedures or the physical state of the patients
involved.  If even obtaining ideal medical care is complicated by schizophrenia, then it is 
likely that intergroup cooperation will be also be disrupted by its presence.  Therefore, I 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3a: Participants will attribute the highest stigma to task partners 
identified as having schizophrenia. 
Hypothesis 3b: Participants will attribute the lowest status to task partners 
identified as having schizophrenia. 
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Generalized anxiety disorder—not only as a result of often being accompanied 
by co-morbid conditions but also in its own right—can be just as debilitating as major 
depressive disorder and negatively impact social involvement (Wittchen et al. 2000; 
Kessler et al. 1999; La Greca and Lopez 1998; Reno and Kenny 1992).  Nevertheless, its 
legitimacy as a diagnosis, like ADHD’s, has been viewed with much skepticism (Stolzer 
2007; Barkley 2002; Ballenger et al. 2001).1  Thus, participants may not consider it a 
strong factor in task partner performance.  Even if accepted as a factor in task 
performance, a diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder could possibly be interpreted 
as useful to the task group.  Anxiousness, though detrimental to our health, may bolster 
our alertness and decision-making in the short term; in a longitudinal study of students 
born in 1946, Lee and colleagues (2006) found that those who were considered by their 
teachers when they were 13 to be high in anxiety were significantly less likely to die via 
accidental circumstances (Lee et al. 2006).  If anxiety confers some degree of protection 
against lethal accidents, then, perhaps, it may also grant those diagnosed with 
generalized anxiety disorder a heightened attention to detail in an intergroup task 
setting.  Thus, I hypothesize that:   
                                                     
1 However, ADHD has been shown to be particularly stigmatizing.  In a vignette study, Martin and 
colleagues’ (2007) found that participants directed the most stigmatization in their study toward persons 
with ADHD.  Stigmatization of persons with ADHD exceeded even that directed toward persons with major 
depression. 
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Hypothesis 4: Except for the condition in which partners are not represented as 
having been diagnosed with a mental disorder, participants will attribute the 
least stigma and most status to partners identified as having been diagnosed 
with generalized anxiety disorder. 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Participant Recruitment 
Participants were recruited through the Duke Interdisciplinary Initiative in Social 
Psychology (DIISP) participant pool at Duke University, and all procedures were 
approved by the Institutional Review Board for Non-Medical Research of the Campus 
Human Subjects Protections Program at Duke University.  The participant pool consists 
of both students and other community members from Durham, NC and the surrounding 
area.   Participants read a prompt indicating that the study was an exploration of 
differences in intergroup interactions when communication is limited to the medium of 
a computer network and in cases where in-person communication is possible.  They 
then signed up for the first half of the study—the computer network component—with 
the instruction that they would sign up for the second half of the study—the in-person 
component—when they came in to participate in the first half.   
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2.3.2 Procedures 
 The experiment took place at the DIISP lab in the Social Science Research 
Institute at Duke University.  Each participant completed the procedures in isolation to 
avoid undue influence of external stimuli.  Arriving for the first half of the study, the 
participant was informed that he or she would be working across a computer network 
with a partner seated in a room on the other side of the lab.  (In fact, there was no 
partner, and the partner was simulated by a computer program.)  The participant was 
then brought to a room and asked to complete a research participant disclosure form on 
Duke University letterhead with a red participant identification number that was 
necessary for participation.  Participants were asked to write down the identification 
number for later use to sign up for the second half of the study.  The form prompted the 
participant to provide his or her gender, highest level of education (high school or less, 
some college/an associate’s degree/vocational training, a bachelor’s degree, or a 
graduate or professional degree), and self-rated health (excellent, very good, good, fair, 
or poor).  Additionally, the form asked whether the participant had ever been diagnosed 
with a chronic physical health problem or a mental disorder or learning disability and, if 
so, what.   
 Computer instructions advised participants that they would be taking part in 
two tasks: one alone (to practice) and one with their partner across the computer 
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network.  Then, during the next week, they would be returning to the lab to discuss a 
social issue face-to-face with a partner.  Upon reading these instructions, participants 
began the first task, a contrast sensitivity exercise commonly used in status 
characteristics research.  Participants looked at 25 rectangles which were approximately 
half shaded and half un-shaded and were asked whether each had a greater shaded or 
un-shaded area.   
 Having completed the individual task, participants were told that people 
working across a computer network usually know a bit about each other, so the 
experimenter would exchange the participant and partner’s research participant 
disclosure forms.  The experimenter collected the completed research participant 
disclosure form and walked to the other hallway to supposedly deliver it to the fictitious 
partner.  Information from the participant’s research participant disclosure form (which 
had its own red participant identification number) was then used to create the fictitious 
partner’s form.  The experimenter completed the partner’s form such that the partner’s 
gender, level of education, and self-rated health were the same as the participant’s.  If 
the participant’s form indicated that he or she had been diagnosed with a chronic 
physical health problem, then so too did the partner’s.  The space on the partner’s form 
to specify which chronic physical health problem was always left blank, as congruence 
with the participant’s answer here was deemed as so specific that it might arouse 
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suspicion.  The questions about diagnosis with a mental disorder or learning disability 
provided the study’s manipulation of the partner’s supposed mental illness label.  
Regardless of whether the participant indicated having a mental disorder, the partner’s 
response depended on the condition to which the participant was randomly assigned.  
The partner’s form indicated either that the partner did not have a mental disorder or 
learning disability or that he or she had been diagnosed with one of 4 conditions 
(Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, or schizophrenia).   
 Participants then began the second task, a 25-question contrast sensitivity 
exercise in which they supposedly worked with their partners.  To motivate them, 
participants were told that their compensation depended on how successfully their 
group performed (although, following the study, all participants were actually 
compensated equally).  For each question, two approximately half-shaded and half-un-
shaded rectangles would appear on the screen for a brief period of time and then 
disappear.  Participants then chose which rectangle they thought was the most shaded, 
and the program paused to allow the partner to supposedly view the rectangles before 
displaying the partner’s answer.  Viewing the partner’s answer, the participant had the 
opportunity to choose whether to stick with his or her original answer or to choose the 
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partner’s answer.  For 20 of the 25 questions, the partner’s answer was programmed to 
differ from the participant’s initial answer. 
 Upon completion of the task, the participant was alerted by the computer 
program that the session had ended and that it was time to choose a topic for the second 
half of the study in which participants would be talking with a partner about a social 
issue.  The experimenter opened an Excel spreadsheet with three topics for discussion 
and indicated that only two people could sign up any given topic using the participant 
identification number provided on the research participant disclosure form.  Duke 
students in several undergraduate classes completed a survey asking how interested 
they would be in talking about each of 20 topics (from very interested to not at all 
interested).  The two topics engendering the closest mean levels of interest to each other 
were chosen as the ones available to the participant.  One topic was already had two 
identification numbers beneath it.  Under the other two remaining topics were one 
identification number and one free space.  The identification number under one of the 
remaining topics had originally appeared on the partner’s form.  Participants concluded 
the study by answering a series of demographic and funnel debriefing questions via 
computer.  There was no actual second half to the study, and participants were informed 
that they had completed the study at this point. 
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2.3.3 Independent Variables 
 The experiment incorporated 5 conditions which varied according to mental 
illness label of the partner as specified on the partner’s research participant disclosure 
form.  In Condition 1 (the control group), the partner’s form indicated no diagnosis with 
a mental disorder or learning disability, while Conditions 2, 3, 4, and 5 indicated 
diagnosis with Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, or schizophrenia respectively.  In contrast to Lucas and 
Phelan (2012)’s approach to representing mental illness—with its expectation that 
participants would “take more from the fact that the partner was hospitalized for mental 
illness than from the partner’s perhaps benign-seeming characterization of the 
hospitalization as related to ‘psychological problems’—this approach focuses on the 
specific valences of particular mental illness labels. 
2.3.4 Dependent Variables 
 Dependent variables for the study include status measures and stigma measures.  
During the second contrast sensitivity task, in which the participants worked with 
fictitious partners, the partner always disagreed on 20 of the 25 problems.  The first 
status variable is an influence measure reflecting the number of times that participants 
changed their answers when the partner disagreed.  Following the study, participants 
completed a series of questionnaires via computer which included other status 
  
 
 39 
 
measures.  They were asked to slide a bar (with choices from 0 to 100) to indicate how 
competent they found their partner, how successfully the group operated, how 
successful they thought the group would be if they met face to face, whether the group 
performed well, and how the group would compare with other groups.  Other status 
questions using this format asked how skilled, respected, knowledgeable, and high 
status the partner was and the extent to which the partner was a leader, was capable, 
and worked hard on the task.   
 Knowing the partner’s identification number from the exchange of research 
participant disclosure forms, participants were able to choose whether to sign up with 
the same partner again or not for the (fictitious) second half of the study.  Among stigma 
measures, one was a social distance measure based on the percentage of participants 
who selected the same partner for the second half of the study.  Other stigma measures 
(paralleling the format used for status measures by which participants could slide a bar 
to provide an answer between 0 and 100), ascertained the extent to which the 
participants wanted the same partner in the next phase, saw themselves as having a lot 
in common with the partner, and found the partner considerate, pleasant, powerful, 
likeable, and cooperative.  The influence measure and social distance measure parallel 
Lucas and Phelan (2012), while the other status and stigma measures come from 
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personal correspondence with the first author, Jeffrey Lucas, regarding an earlier, pre-
publication version of that manuscript. 
2.3.5 Sample  
 The full sample consisted of 167 participants.  Analyses were performed on a 
smaller sample of 69 participants which excluded those who knew they were not 
working with a real partner and those who failed a check question designed to gauge 
their attention to the study.  Specifically, the post-study funnel debriefing included the 
question “Did you know that you were not actually working with a real partner in this 
study?”  For the final analyses, 55 individuals who answered in the affirmative were 
excluded.  Additionally, when participants were completing the stigma and status 
questions, one question was included that instructed them to slide the bar to a specific 
number.  Forty four participants were excluded from the final analyses for failing to 
slide the bar to the specified number (a lack of action which called into question their 
attention to other parts of the study).  In addition to the 44 individuals who failed to 
provide the correct answer to the check question, another 11 individuals would have 
been excluded for this reason had they not already been excluded on the basis of having 
believed that they were not working with a real partner.  
 From the full sample, 72 participants (43.37%) were men and 94 (56.63%) were 
women, and whose average age was 28.75.  Seventy-four (44.58%) participants identified 
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themselves as white, while 49 (29.52%) identified themselves as black or African 
American, 30 (18.07%) as Asian, and 9 (5.42%) as multiracial.  Ten participants identified 
themselves as Hispanic (6.02%).  Three (1.81%) reported having less than a high 
diploma, while 22 (13.25%) reported being high school graduates, 64 (38.55%) having 
some college or vocational school experience, 27 (16.27%) having a Bachelor’s degree, 19 
(11.45%) having some graduate school experience, and 31 (18.67%) having a graduate or 
professional degree.  Random distribution yielded 31 participants (18.56%) whose 
partner ostensibly had not been diagnosed with a mental health disorder or learning 
disability, 39 (23.35%) whose partner was presented as having Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder, 30 (17.96%) whose partner was presented as having Major Depressive 
Disorder, 34 (20.36%) whose partner was presented as having Attention 
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, and 32 (19.16%) whose partner was presented as having 
schizophrenia. One participant chose not to provide his or her gender, while 5 
participants did not provide information on race, and 1 participant did not provide his 
or her education level.   
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Table 1.  Study 1 Sample Descriptive Statistics (n = 69) 
 
     Mean/Proportion Standard Deviation 
Age      27.43   11.60  
Gender     .6377   .4842 
Race      
White     .4493   .5011 
Black/African American  .2753   .4500 
Asian     .2174   .4155 
Multiracial    .0290   .1690 
Hispanic     .0870   .2838 
Education 
Less than High School Diploma .0145   .1204 
High School Diploma/GED  .1449   .3546 
Some College/Vocational School .3478   .4798  
Bachelor’s Degree   .1594   .3687 
Some Graduate School  .1304   .3392 
Graduate or Professional Degree .2029   .4051 
Experimental Condition 
Control    .1739   .3818 
GAD     .2029   .4051 
MDD     .2029   .4051 
ADHD     .2174   .4155 
Schizophrenia    .2029   .4051 
 
Note: Percentages do not sum to one hundred due to rounding 
 
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample used in the study’s analyses.  
Compared with the full sample, this smaller sample was more female (63.77% vs. 
56.63%) and slightly younger (27 vs. 29) on average.  The sample included nearly the 
same percentage of those who identified as white (44.93% vs. 44.58%), and a slightly 
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lower percentage of individuals who identified as black or African American (27.54% vs. 
29.52%), Asian (21.74% vs. 18.07%), or multiracial (2.9% vs. 5.42%).  Additionally, 
slightly more participants in the smaller sample identified as Hispanic (8.70% vs. 6.02%), 
and the educational breakdown was largely similar (with 1.45% reporting less than a 
high school diploma vs. 1.81% in the full sample, 14.49% having completed high school 
vs. 13.25%, 34.78% having some college or vocational school experience vs. 38.55%, 
15.94% with a Bachelor’s degree vs. 16.27%, 13.04% having some graduate school vs. 
11.45%, and 20.29% having a graduate or professional degree vs. 18.67%).  
Demographically, the smaller sample excluding participants for the purpose of 
improving data quality is very similar to the full sample.  Moreover, participants in the 
smaller sample were fairly evenly distributed into experimental conditions, with 12 in 
the control group (17.39% vs. 18.56% in the full sample), 14 in the Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder group (20.29% vs. 23.35%), 14 in the Major Depressive Disorder group (20.29% 
vs. 17.96%), 15 in the Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder group (21.74% vs. 
20.36%), and 14 in the schizophrenia group (20.29% vs. 19.16%). 
2.4 Results 
Hypothesis 1 posits that participants will have more stigmatizing views of 
partners identified as having a mental disorder than those who are not.  Table 2 
provides one-tailed t-test results for stigma outcomes designed to measure the extent of 
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participants’ perceptions of social distance from their partners.  Participants whose 
partners were presented as having ADHD found their partners less pleasant on average 
(53.87 out of 100, p <.05) than participants whose partners were presented as having no 
mental disorder.  However, overall, Hypothesis 1 is unsupported.  Participants in the 
control group selected the same partner in 41.67% of opportunities.  Participants whose 
partners were presented as having a mental disorder did not select the same partner less 
frequently for the second task than participants in the control group (except with 
marginal significance in the case of participants whose partners were presented as 
having GAD who chose the same partner in 35.71% of opportunities, p <.10).  Moreover, 
participants whose partners were presented as having a mental disorder did not (at the 
.05 level of significance) express less interest in having the same partners in the next 
phase, see themselves as having less in common with the partners, or consider their 
partners less considerate, less pleasant (except in the ADHD condition), less powerful, 
less likeable, or less cooperative than participants in the control group. 
 
  
 
Table 2.  Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) and Significance Test Results on Stigma Outcomes (n = 69) 
 
Variable     Control GAD  MDD  ADHD  Schizophrenia 
 
Percent of participants selecting same partner 41.67%  35.71%t  50.00%  46.67%  57.14% 
100 = Want same partner in next phase 52.83 (27.34) 65.36 (20.08) 57.50 (23.83) 49.80 (19.50) 57.36 (19.89) 
100 = Has a lot in common with partner 50.50 (27.63) 50.36 (19.39) 58.36 (24.34) 56.87 (20.54) 50.00 (17.98)  
100 = Partner was considerate   55.75 (23.57) 65.14 (16.12) 64.00 (18.41) 58.80 (15.12) 66.00 (22.38)  
100 = Partner was pleasant   62.33 (20.16) 64.71 (18.20) 63.07 (21.80) 53.87 (14.76)* 67.00 (17.46) 
100 = Partner is powerful   49.25 (23.82) 57.71 (21.16) 54.29 (18.24) 50.47 (15.37) 57.50 (26.31)  
100 = Partner is likeable   60.5 (23.26) 61.57 (19.43) 61.64 (19.27) 58.87 (13.52) 63.57 (17.89)  
100 = Partner was cooperative   57.42 (23.34) 63.93 (23.16) 65.36 (18.43) 57.4 (18.89) 68.93 (16.06)  
 
### = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a one sample binomial test producing a one-sided p < .001 
## = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a one sample binomial test producing a one-sided p <.01 
# = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a one sample binomial test producing a one-sided p <.05 
& = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a one sample binomial test producing a one-sided p <.10 
 
*** = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < .001 
** = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < .01 
* = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < .05 
t = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p <.10 
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Hypothesis 2 suggests that participants will attribute lower status to task 
partners identified as having a mental disorder than task partners who are not.  Table 3 
provides one-tailed t-tests for status outcomes designed to measure participants’ 
perceptions of partner influence.  The analyses reveal mixed results.  On the one hand, 
participants whose partners allegedly had GAD or schizophrenia were not influenced 
significantly less often than participants in the control condition to change their answers 
in response to partners’ answers on the cooperative contrast sensitivity exercise.  On the 
other hand, participants in the MDD and ADHD conditions changed their answers less 
frequently than participants in the control condition.  Participants in the control 
condition changed their answers, on average, 10.42 times out of 25 opportunities.  
However, participants in the MDD condition changed their answers, on average, 8.64 
times (p < .05), while participants in the ADHD condition changed their answers, on 
average, 8.40 times (p < .05).   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3.  Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) and Significance Test Results on Status Outcomes (n = 69) 
 
Variable    Control  GAD  MDD   ADHD   Schizophrenia 
 
Times influenced in 25 opportunities 10.42 (4.23) 9.86 (2.18) 8.64 (3.10)*  8.40 (4.37)*  9.71 (3.47)  
100 = Partner competent   62.33 (27.93) 69 (21.81) 74.71 (17.60)  62.33 (19.83)  75.5 (16.06) 
100 = Group was successful  58.67 (23.52) 60.71 (22.25) 57.21 (17.74)  58.27 (15.93)  61.43 (16.98) 
100 = Group would be successful if 70.33 (24.47) 80.64 (11.59) 73.57 (24.34)  67.47 (22.60)  71.21 (15.04) 
          they met face to face 
100 = Group performed well  62.33 (18.41) 55.57 (20.68) 50.93 (19.56)*  53.33 (14.43)*  57.5 (16.36) 
100 = Group would compare well 58.17 (23.02) 60.64 (22.38) 52.93 (17.30)  58.20 (15.08)  53.57 (13.43) 
          with other groups  
100 = Partner was skilled  62.17 (24.61) 71.57 (16.09) 68.07 (17.39)  56.40 (19.95)  65.64 (19.90) 
100 = Partner respected   68.83 (21.60) 67.14 (21.55) 60.36 (25.39)  55.20 (17.79)**  65.14 (17.03) 
100 = Partner is knowledgeable  67.50 (17.97) 62.50 (20.16) 64.21 (17.29)  56.27 (17.75)*  67.50 (21.10) 
100 = Partner is high status  61.25 (21.09) 56.43 (22.51) 61.00 (19.82)  51.53 (23.03) t  54.93 (20.75)  
100 = Partner is a leader   50.92 (18.59) 58.50 (20.44) 61.14 (17.12)  53.93 (15.70)  55.00 (25.08) 
100 = Partner is capable   60.83 (27.19) 75.29 (16.60) 71.14 (19.01)  63.00 (21.10)  76.21 (17.25) 
100 = Partner worked hard on the task 59.42 (22.66) 77.79 (16.57) 74.07 (22.25)  63.40 (18.13)  84.57 (12.51) 
 
*** = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < .001 
** = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < .01 
* = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < .05 
t = Significantly different from Control in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p <.10
47 
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While participants in the GAD and schizophrenia conditions did not attribute 
lower status (at p <. 05) for any of the other status measures, participants in the MDD 
and ADHD conditions did in some cases.  Both those in the MDD condition and those in 
the ADHD condition believed that their groups performed, on average, worse than 
participants in the control group (50.93 and 53.33 vs. 62.33 out of 100, p < .05).  
Additionally, those in the ADHD condition rated their partners as less respected (55.20 
vs. 68.83 out of 100, p <.01) and less knowledgeable (56.27 vs. 67.50 out of 100, p <.05) 
than participants in the control condition rated their partners. 
Hypothesis 3a posited that participants would attribute the highest stigma to 
task partners identified as having schizophrenia.  Table 2 reveals no support for greatest 
stigma in the schizophrenia condition, as no estimates reached significance.  Hypothesis 
3b postulated that participants would attribute the lowest status to task partners 
identified as having schizophrenia.  Table 3 reveals no support for lowest status in the 
schizophrenia condition.   
Hypothesis 4 suggested that, except in the control condition, participants would 
attribute the least stigma and most status to partners identified as having been 
diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder.  Table 2 reveals no support for lowest 
stigma (outside of the control condition) in the GAD condition, as no estimates reached 
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significance.  Table 3 reveals no support for most status (outside of the control 
condition) in the GAD condition.   
Overall, participants with partners presented as having mental disorders did not 
evaluate their partners more negatively than participants in the control group evaluated 
their partners.  This was particularly true in the case of stigma outcomes wherein the 
only significant finding in the expected direction was that participants in the ADHD 
condition viewed their partners, on average, as less pleasant than participants in the 
control group viewed their partners.  However, in terms of status perceptions, 
participants in the ADHD condition negatively evaluated their partners on four 
indicators: they changed their answers more frequently, saw their group as performing 
less well, and perceived their partners as less respected and less knowledgeable.    
2.5 Discussion 
To the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to gauge stigma and status 
perceptions of a partner in a task performance scenario on the basis of specific mental 
disorder labels.  Its results reveal certain unexpected trends.  Prior research on mental 
health stigma would suggest that participants would view a partner’s mental disorder 
as “deeply discrediting,” perhaps representing a “[blemish] of character” (Goffman 
1963:3).  However, of the 4 disorders considered (GAD, MDD, ADHD, and 
Schizophrenia), only 1 produced a significant, stigmatized attribution, and, even then, 
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on only one variable; specifically, the average participant viewed the average partner 
with ADHD as less pleasant than participants in the control condition viewed their 
partners.   
This unexpected pattern of findings may have resulted from the way in which 
mental disorders were represented in the study.  Lucas and Phelan (2012), using similar 
experimental procedures to this study, found significant evidence for stigmatization of 
persons with mental illness.  However, when they considered perceptions of mental 
illness, they represented partners as having been previously hospitalized for 12 months 
for psychological problems.  Participants in the present study never met partners face to 
face or even directly spoke with them (meaning that there were no behavioral cues of 
mental illness available to gauge severity).  Thus, participants in the present study may 
have assumed their partners to be higher-functioning than they would have if partners 
were described as having been hospitalized for a lengthy period of time for their 
conditions.  It is possible that, when access to behavioral indicators is absent, mental 
illness only functions as a status characteristic and is stigmatized in task situations when 
it is perceived as very severe.   
Status characteristics theory and research considering mental illness as a status 
characteristic would suggest that mental disorder labels would trigger differential 
perceptions of status both between those not identified as having a mental disorder and 
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those who were so identified and across diagnosis types (e.g., Lucas and Phelan 2012; 
Hopcroft 2002; Webster, Jr. and Hysom 1998; Wagner and Berger 1993; Eagly et al. 1992; 
Carli 1991 Hopcroft 2002; Webster, Jr. and Hysom 1998; Wagner and Berger 1993; Eagly 
et al. 1992; Carli 1991).  Evidence of these presumptions was mixed in the present study.  
On the one hand, partners represented as having MDD or ADHD had significantly less 
influence on participants; out of 25 opportunities, participants changed their answers, on 
average, 10.42 times in the control group as compared with 8.64 times (p < .05) in the 
MDD condition and 8.40 times (p < .05) in the ADHD condition.  In addition, while the 
group was seen as performing less well when the partner had MDD or ADHD than 
when the partner was not represented as having a mental disorder.  Further, partners 
with ADHD were seen as less respected and less knowledgeable.  On the other hand, 
partners with GAD and Schizophrenia were not viewed significantly more negatively 
for any status outcome. 
Why did ADHD status trigger the highest number of negative status 
attributions? ADHD’s symptomatology could reasonably be seen as directly detrimental 
to the task performed in this study even if of low severity.  Participants may have 
trusted the partner’s input less in the ADHD condition, because the rectangles in the 
contrast sensitivity problems only appeared on-screen for a brief period of time before 
the computer program requested an answer.  Only brief inattention would have been 
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necessary to miss the prompt for a problem entirely.  This explanation is consistent with 
participants’ statements during the de-briefing process.  Participants were asked 
whether they had ever heard of any stereotypes about each disorder tested in the study, 
and, if so, what those stereotypes were and which of those stereotypes they believed.  Of 
the 15 participants in the ADHD condition for the final analyses, 10 believed that people 
with ADHD had trouble paying attention, and, of those 10, 4 suggested that people with 
ADHD are incapable of ever paying attention, while 2 argued that they were less 
intelligent than people without ADHD.  One participant specifically tied inattention to 
task performance, arguing that people with ADHD were “not very good at tasks, 
because they don’t pay attention.”   
Participants also may have viewed persons with ADHD negatively on some 
status indicators because of their greater familiarity with the disorder.  Each participant 
was asked in the post-study debriefing questionnaire about whether he or she knew 
someone with GAD, MDD, ADHD, or schizophrenia.  In the ADHD condition, 12 of the 
15 participants indicated that they knew someone with ADHD.  In contrast, participants 
in the other non-control conditions knew someone with the disorder their partner 
supposedly had at rates of 5/14 for GAD, 8/14 for MDD, and 4/14 for schizophrenia.  
Note that more participants in the MDD condition knew someone with their partner’s 
disorder than did participants for any other non-control condition, suggesting that 
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familiarity with the disorder also may have fueled the negative status attributions 
directed at partners presumed to have MDD.   
More work is necessary to understand whether negative attributions based on 
mental illness in task scenarios are partially a product of severity (e.g., hospitalization or 
no history of hospitalization), task relevance (of which the evidence of attributions 
toward ADHD in this study is suggestive), or familiarity (as potentially suggested by the 
difference in the number of people who knew someone with the disorder their partner 
supposedly had between the disorders with at least one negative stigma or status 
evaluation (MDD and ADHD) and those without any significant, negative evaluations).  
Nevertheless, this study does provide partial evidence that MDD and ADHD may 
function as status characteristics differentiated from a status of not having a recognized 
mental disorder.  
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3. Our Own Worst Enemies: How Mental Disorder Labels 
Alter Task Performance (Study 2) 
People with mental illness often experience great difficulty in their vocational 
pursuits.  More working-age adults with psychiatric illnesses receive Supplemental 
Security Income (34%) or Social Security Disability Insurance (27%) than their 
counterparts in any other diagnostic categories (McAlpine and Warner 2002).  Further, 
national surveys indicate that the percentage of employed among those with a mental 
illness may be as low as 44% (McAlpine and Warner 2002).   One factor obstructing the 
vocational success of the mentally ill is educational attainment (Freudenberg and Ruglis 
2007).  The mentally ill are less likely to graduate from primary school, graduate from 
high school, enter college, and graduate from college (Breslau et al. 2008).  Widening the 
lens further, educational attainment itself often requires adequate performance on 
standardized tests.  Given the importance of test-taking to educational attainment, and 
educational attainment’s positive relationship with vocational success and income, 
understanding the potential influence of mental illness stigmatization on test-taking 
may be important to understanding mental illness-based stratification (U. S. Census 
Bureau 2009).   
There are at least two possibilities by which mental illness stigma may negatively 
impact test-taking performance.  First, mental illness symptomatology plays a role in 
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work skills and vocational prospects and, therefore, likely also impacts test-taking 
success by distracting from the questions at hand (Anthony et al. 1995).  Equally 
important, however, may be the pernicious effects of internalized stigma.  In addition to 
suffering from the external barriers imposed by stigmatizers via status loss and 
discrimination, the stigmatized may, in response, erect their own impediments by taking 
negative perceptions of themselves to heart (e.g., Hinshaw 2007; Link and Phelan 2001).   
Stereotypes, or beliefs characterizing groups which overlook individual 
differentiation, and their associated stigmatizing attributions may become accepted as 
personally applicable.1 When this occurs, internalized stigma or “self-stigma” arises 
(Drapalski et al. 2013:264; Hinshaw 2007).  Modified labeling theory suggests that when 
a person is diagnosed with a mental disorder, the negative cultural perceptions of that 
disorder become accepted as personally relevant.  Among the mentally ill, this is not 
even dependent on symptom severity (Kroska and Harkness 2008).  The consequences of 
self-stigma among the mentally ill are serious, including diminished hope, lower self-
esteem, lower self-efficacy, avoidant coping, and more severe psychiatric symptoms 
(Drapalski et al. 2013).  This study considers whether self-stigma may also negatively 
impact the mentally ill by diminishing their test-taking abilities.  Specifically, this study 
                                                     
1 However, Steele (2010) argues that personal applicability is not necessary for stereotype threat to take hold.  
It is enough to simply be a member of a stigmatized group and have exposure to stereotypes about that 
group.  
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considers whether stereotype threat invoked on the basis of a mental illness label 
hinders performance on a standardized test. 
3.1 Theoretical Background 
3.1.1 Stereotype Threat 
Claude Steele describes stereotype threat as the fear of confirming a stereotype 
about a personally-relevant group identification.  It is “a situational threat...that, in 
general form, can affect the members of any group about whom a negative stereotype 
exists” (Steele 1997:614).  It manifests itself in domains where threatening negative 
stereotypes are relevant to the affected persons and, through distraction, self-
consciousness, and related issues, can result in diminished performance on a variety of 
tasks (Croizet and Claire 1998).  Stereotype threat can induce powerfully negative 
effects.  Those affected by it often experience social and material disadvantage and have 
difficulty achieving their goals as a result of their underperformance (Hogg 2003).  
Stereotype threat may then lead to “disidentification” or “a reconceptualization of the 
self and of one’s values so as to remove the domain [in which stereotype threat is 
produced] as a self-identity, as a basis of self-evaluation” as a means of diffusing the 
negativity brought on the belabored struggle to succeed (Steele 1997:614).  Such 
disidentification can motivate withdrawal from educational and occupational 
opportunities.   
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Steele and Aronson (1995) first identified stereotype threat in a series of 
experiments in which they administered the Verbal section of the General Record Exam 
(GRE) to African-American and white college students.  Controlling for self-reported 
previous performance on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), when researchers 
described the test questions as measuring intellect, African-American students achieved 
lower scores than white students.  However, when researchers described performance 
on the test as non-indicative of ability, score averages converged between the two 
groups (Steele and Aronson 1995).   
Concern over confirming negative stereotypes about African-Americans’ 
underperformance on standardized tests motivated the African-American test-takers to 
actively avoid underperforming themselves.  Yet, the pressure of overcoming these 
stereotypes proved distracting and actually led to underperformance itself; specifically, 
African-American test-takers answered fewer items in more time with less accuracy than 
white students when the test was framed as evaluative of ability.  Steele and Aronson 
(1995) further found that a test need not even be diagnostic of ability in order to trigger 
stereotype threat; all that was necessary to trigger stereotype threat among African-
American test-takers was to ask them to self-identify their racial/ethnic background 
prior to answering test questions. 
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Building on Steele and Aronson’s (1995) work, later studies noted the impact of 
stereotype threat outside of the realm of academic-oriented test-taking among diverse 
sociodemographic groups.  Stone and colleagues (1999) found that black participants 
performed worse on a golf task when it was presented as indicative of sports 
intelligence.  However, when the golf task was presented as indicative of natural athletic 
ability, white participants fared worse.  Also, when faced with the stereotype of being 
racist, whites distanced themselves from blacks in the study regardless of their explicit 
or implicit prejudices (Goff, Steele, and Davies 2008).  Regarding gender, Leyens and 
colleagues (2000) found that men performed worse than women on affective tasks when 
they were described as a way to understand gender differences in processing affective 
information than when they were not.  Similarly, men achieved lower scores than 
women on a test when it was described as measuring social sensitivity than when it was 
presented as a test of complex information processing (Koenig and Eagly 2005).  
Additionally, women’s performance in online chess diminished dramatically when 
gender stereotypes were activated and they were told that they were playing against 
men (Maass et al. 2008).  Finally, older adults faced with negative cultural beliefs about 
how memory deteriorates with age performed worse on memory tasks (Hess et al. 2003).   
Although studies of stereotype threat have involved a variety of activities, 
academic-oriented test-taking remains one of the central domains in which researchers 
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address the possible presence of the phenomenon.  Regarding race, Blascovich and 
colleagues (2001) found that African Americans performed worse on difficult questions 
from the Remote Associates Test under conditions of stereotype threat; moreover, those 
who experienced stereotype threat experienced greater increases in mean arterial blood 
pressure while taking the test.  Mayer and Hanges (2003) determined that African 
Americans obtained lower scores on the Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices test (a 
test deliberately designed to be culture-free) when told that the test measured 
intelligence.  Further, racial/ethnic-based stereotype threat depressed West Indians’ 
performance on GRE questions (Deaux et al. 2007).  Other researchers discovered that 
when whites were reminded of the stereotype that Asians were better at math, they 
underperformed on challenging math tests (Aronson et al. 1999).  Bridging race and 
gender, Gonzales, Blanton, and Williams (2002) found that stereotype threat negatively 
impacted Latinas’ test-taking performance.   
A number of other characteristics have been identified as bases for stereotype 
threat via test-taking manipulations.  One is gender; researchers have found that 
stereotype threat diminishes women’s performance on difficult math tests, particularly 
among women with high stigma consciousness (Brown and Pinel 2003; Davies et al. 
2002; O’Brien and Crandall 2003; Spencer, Steele, and Quinn 1999).  Another is 
socioeconomic status; Croizet and Claire (1998) found that low SES participants 
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performed worse than high SES participants on a test comprised of questions similar to 
those on the GRE when the questions were described as indicative of intellectual ability.  
Later, Spencer and Castano (2007) found that when a test composed of GRE questions 
was presented as a test of intelligence or when socioeconomic status was made salient, 
low socioeconomic status students underperformed.   
These bases for stereotype threat may only be scratching the surface; Steele 
(1997:614) argues that stereotype threat could “affect the members of any group about 
whom a negative stereotype exists (e. g., skateboarders, older adults, White men, gang 
members).” Social scientists have largely overlooked the potential impact of stereotype 
threat on adults labeled with stigmatizing mental disorders.   
To the author’s knowledge, only one study has considered the role of mental 
illness as a basis for stereotype threat.  Diverging from previous stereotype threat 
research (which primarily focused on visible stigmas) Quinn, Kahng, and Crocker (2004) 
considered whether being asked about concealable stigmas (specifically mental illnesses) 
would impact performance on GRE questions.  In one experiment, they pre-screened 
participants for mental health history via three questions and then, at the study, 
provided participants with a demographic questionnaire to complete which either 
included the same mental health screening questions or did not.  During the experiment, 
participants completed GRE questions, and the researchers compared across participants 
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with and without a history of mental illness who did or did answer questions about 
their mental health history during the study.  They found that participants who revealed 
a history of mental illness (regardless of specific diagnosis) performed significantly 
worse on GRE questions than those who had a history of mental illness but did not 
reveal it.   
In follow-up experiments, Quinn and colleagues (2004) also found: 1) evidence 
that participants previously treated for depression performed worse on GRE questions 
after revealing their mental illness history than participants who had not been treated 
previously for depression; and 2) that persons with eating disorders (representing a 
concealable mental disorder assumed by the researchers to not carry the same negative 
competency connotations in a test-taking situation) did not perform significantly worse 
when they revealed their disorder than when they did not.   
Quinn and colleagues’ (2004) work sets a useful foundation for mental illness-
based stereotype threat research but suffers from a key limitation.  Of mental illnesses, 
the stereotypes associated with depression and eating disorders have questionable 
relevance to test-taking, and, in fact, Quinn and colleagues do not directly establish the 
relevance of stereotypes about either to the test-taking domain.  It is possible, then, that 
the diminished performance found in the case of those who revealed their history of 
depression resulted not from concern on the part of these participants about confirming 
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a negative stereotype relevant to the test-taking domain but rather pre-occupation with 
thinking about a devalued status for reasons unrelated to the test-taking task.  The 
present study contributes to the literature on stereotype threat by exploring whether 
stereotype threat invoked on the basis of a domain-relevant mental illness—specifically, 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder—impedes test-taking performance. 
3.1.2 Theoretical Relevance of Adult ADHD to Test-taking and 
Stereotype Threat 
Test-taking among adults with ADHD represents an appropriate realm for the 
study of stereotype threat, as it is consistent with the conditions under which Steele 
(1997) suggests that stereotype threat occurs.  Adults with ADHD are members of a 
negatively stereotyped group (Jussim et al. 2000).  Although positive framings of ADHD 
have entered public discussion (Hallowell and Ratey 1995), the disorder’s negative 
aspects are more widely recognized and accepted, lending support to the 
conceptualization of ADHD as a stigmatized condition (e.g., Wasserstein et al. 2001; 
Weiss et al. 1999).  Research suggests that children associate ADHD with violence and 
antisocial behavior, and some prefer social distance from their peers with the disorder 
(Walker et al. 2008).  College students express stigmatization toward those with ADHD 
as well, indicating that they are less academically competent than persons without 
ADHD (Chew et al. 2009; Canu et al. 2008; Newton 2008).  Thus, it is perhaps 
  
 63 
 
unsurprising how Lee Jussim and colleagues argue that “Attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD) probably qualifies as a characterological stigma in Erving Goffman’s 
(1963) typology,” as “the ADHD label represents a devalued social identity based on 
flaws in one’s behavior (and, to a lesser extent, personality)” (Jussim et al. 2000:390). 
The standardized test-taking process taps directly into the stigmatization of 
adults with ADHD.  Acceptance of negative stereotypes as personally applicable is a 
precondition for receiving accommodations on Educational Testing Service (ETS) 
standardized tests such as the Graduate Record Exam (GRE).  In order to receive 
accommodations on such tests, adults with ADHD must demonstrate evidence of long-
standing impairment across multiple domains (Educational Testing Service 2008).  ETS-
acceptable examples of this impairment include making careless mistakes, become 
distracted by “extraneous stimuli,” and failing to follow instructions, all of which would 
be salient in a testing environment (Educational Testing Service 2008).  Thus, the present 
study represents a logical framework from which to examine medicalized labeling as a 
potential basis for stereotype threat. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Participant Selection 
Participants were recruited through the Duke Interdisciplinary Initiative in Social 
Psychology (DIISP) participant pool at Duke University, Duke List (Duke University’s 
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free classifieds marketplace), Craig’s List (an online classified ads and forum site), flyers 
posted on bulletin boards in public meeting spaces and psychiatric treatment facilities, 
and through e-mail listservs connected with local ADHD support groups to participate 
in a test of experimental GRE questions allegedly being considered for inclusion on 
future GREs.  Spencer and colleagues (1999) and O’Brien and Crandall (2003) suggest 
that stereotype threat does not apply unless the task at hand is difficult.  Individuals 
facing simple tasks may be able to perform them competently even in the face of 
stereotype threat.  The difficulty of the GRE, then, would justify its use in the present 
experiment to determine the impact of stereotype threat on adults with ADHD’s test-
taking performance.  In addition to the GRE being an arguably difficult test in and of 
itself, a higher percentage of difficult questions were included among those asked in the 
study than would be the case in an actual administration of the GRE so as to increase the 
difficulty of the test-taking situation further. 
Additionally, given that one of the conditions that Steele (1997) identifies as 
necessary for the emergence of stereotype threat is domain relevance, efforts were made 
to recruit current or recent students.  Utilizing Duke University outlets for recruitment 
(such as the Duke Interdisciplinary Initiative in Social Psychology participant pool and 
Duke’s free classifieds marketplace, Duke List) increased the likelihood that participants 
would be current or recent students.  Current or recent students would likely have taken 
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either the American College Test (ACT) or the SAT Reasoning Test (SAT) in recent years 
and could also be interested in taking other standardized tests required for professional 
school admissions, so the standardized test-taking domain would likely be significant to 
them.  Additionally, a standardized test-taking domain may be important to 
participants—regardless of student status—simply because of the way in which 
standardized tests have historically been presented as measurements of aptitude (Sacks 
2001).   
Participants took an online pre-study demographic questionnaire which 
included the following question: “Do you have any mental health disorder(s) or learning 
disability/disabilities which could make answering test questions more difficult, such as 
dyslexia, Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) or Autism? (You are still welcome to participate in the study if you do).”  
Answer choices included: Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD/ADD), 
Autism, Dyslexia, Other mental health disorders or learning disabilities which could 
interfere with test-taking or learning (please specify), and None.  This made it possible 
to indirectly distinguish between participants who had ADHD and participants who did 
not.   
An alternative version of the recruitment text specifically mentioning that 
researchers were interested in recruiting participants with ADHD, since new potential 
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GRE questions are rarely tested with participants with ADHD, was also circulated after 
at least 30 participants had been recruited for each non-ADHD condition.  This 
facilitated direct recruitment of participants with ADHD.  Additionally, the study was 
initially restricted to current students but then expanded to a broader population given 
the difficulty of recruiting only ADHD-affected participants who were current students 
in sufficient numbers.   Most of the participants with ADHD (30 out of 56) were, 
nevertheless, current students.  Recruitment yielded a total of 114 participants (see Table 
4). 
3.2.2 Procedures 
All procedures took place in the DIISP lab of the Social Science Research Institute 
(SSRI) at Duke University, and each participant completed the procedures in isolation to 
avoid confounding factors associated with multiple test-takers being in the testing room 
simultaneously.  After filling out an informed consent form, each participant with 
ADHD was either randomly assigned to the first or second condition, while each 
participant without ADHD was randomly assigned to either the third or fourth 
condition (see Table 4).  
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Table 4: Study 2 Experimental Conditions (Number of Participants) 
Condition 1 (26) 
Only participants 
with ADHD 
 
No explicit 
invocation of 
stereotype threat 
Condition 2 (27) 
Only participants 
with ADHD 
 
Explicit invocation 
of stereotype threat  
 
Condition 3 (31) 
Only participants 
without ADHD 
 
No explicit 
invocation of 
stereotype threat 
Condition 4 (30) 
Only participants 
without ADHD 
 
Explicit invocation 
of stereotype threat 
 
Those assigned to Condition 1 were led to a testing room and administered 
printed instructions, GRE standardized test questions, and bubble sheets on which to 
record answers as well as scratch paper.  The test questions were divided into two 
sections: 1) a section containing 15 verbal questions from the GRE and 2) a section 
containing 14 quantitative questions from the GRE.  For both sections of the test, 
questions came from the most recent GRE General Test preparation book released by the 
ETS (Educational Testing Service 2002).  For the verbal section, I covered the breadth of 
question types by selecting 3 fill-in-the-blank questions, 4 analogy questions, 4 reading 
comprehension questions, and 4 antonym questions from previous GRE test GR92-1.  
For the quantitative section, I covered the breadth of question types by selecting 7 
questions in which information is supplied and the test-taker is asked to indicate 
whether the value in column A is greater, the value in column B is greater, the two 
values are equal, or the relationship cannot be determined from the information given 
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and 7 questions which the test-taker is instructed to answer by choosing one possibility 
from among 5 answer choices.  As with the verbal questions, these questions came from 
previous GRE test GR92-1 (Educational Testing Service 2002).  Using data from three 
years of these questions’ administration, I determined the difficulty of questions for each 
section of GRE test GR92-1.  For the present study’s verbal section, I selected 5 answered 
correctly by 28% or fewer of test-takers, 4 answered correctly by between 29% and 49% 
of test-takers, 3 answered correctly by between 50 and 74% of test-takers, and 3 
answered correctly by between 75% and 100% of test-takers (Educational Testing Service 
2002).  For the quantitative section of the present study, I selected 5 questions answered 
correctly by 33% or fewer test-takers, 4 questions answered correctly by between 34% 
and 49% of test-takers, 3 questions answered correctly by between 50% and 74% of test-
takers, and 2 questions answered correctly by between 75% and 100% of test-takers. The 
emphasis on more difficult questions was intended to make the test-taking situation 
itself difficult enough for stereotype threat to be relevant, though some easier questions 
were included to ensure greater variance among test-takers’ scores (Spencer et al. 1999; 
O’Brien and Crandall 2003).   
Participants were given 15 minutes to complete the verbal section (representing 
an equivalent amount of time for each question to that given in a normal administration 
of a verbal GRE section) and 22 minutes and 30 seconds to complete the quantitative 
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section (representing an equivalent amount of time for each question to that given in a 
normal administration of a quantitative GRE section) with no break allowed between the 
sections.  No time left over from the first section carried over to the second section.  The 
verbal section was administered first.  After the allotted time for the verbal section has 
passed, the experimenter collected the materials associated with the verbal section and 
administered printed materials associated with the quantitative section.   
Once the participant completed all of the above components of the experiment, 
the experimenter went to another room briefly to calculate the number and percentage 
of answers which the participant answered correctly for each section and overall.  The 
experimenter provided this percentage to the participant as knowledge of it was 
relevant to the post-study questionnaire.  Finally, the participant was asked to complete 
a diagnosis questionnaire containing questions regarding diagnosis type, medication 
usage, and symptomatology and a post-study questionnaire.  The post-study 
questionnaire provided a funnel debriefing and also asked about the importance of the 
experimental GRE test that participants took. 
A participant assigned to Condition 2 completed the procedures as specified for 
Condition 1 with one key exceptions; stereotype threat was directly invoked.  The 
participant in Condition 2 was informed that, based on information provided in the pre-
study recruitment survey, it was understood that he or she had ADHD.  Then, the 
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experimenter invoked stereotype threat by having the participant complete a screener 
containing questions based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
IV (DSM-IV) criteria for ADHD as well as questions regarding diagnosis type and 
medication usage (a form not administered until after completion of the GRE questions 
in Condition 1) and warning the participant that people with ADHD typically score 
much lower on the questions than persons who did not have ADHD.  Mentioning to 
participants that members of a group they belong to do not perform as well on a task as 
members of other groups is a well-tested means of invoking stereotype threat (Spencer 
et al. 1999).   
A participant assigned to Condition 3 followed the same procedures as specified 
for participants in Condition 1.  Participants in Condition 4 followed the same 
procedures as participants in Condition 2 with an important exception: given their lack 
of ADHD status, participants in Condition 4 were not told that experimenters knew that 
they had ADHD based on their pre-study questionnaires.  Persons without ADHD 
would not necessarily be expected to view failure to remember directions, focus on 
question wording, or keep one’s attention on the test or a warning that persons with 
ADHD might have difficulty completing the test as relevant to a stereotype about one of 
their stigmatized group memberships.  However, some studies of stereotype threat have 
revealed that persons exposed to procedures designed to invoke stereotype threat on the 
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basis of a given stereotype may experience diminished performance even when that 
stereotype is not personally applicable (Wheeler and Petty 2001).  Thus, this experiment 
provided an opportunity to examine whether performance was more greatly diminished 
among those specifically exposed to stereotype threat on the basis of a medicalized label 
if the stereotype invoked was personally-applicable.   
3.3 Hypotheses 
A number of ADHD symptoms have the potential to negatively impact test-
taking performance, including difficulty getting started on tasks that require a lot of 
thought, trouble concentrating on work that is boring or repetitive, and a tendency to 
feel restless or fidgety.  Thus, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: On average, participants with ADHD (Conditions 1 and 2) will 
achieve lower scores on GRE questions than participants without ADHD 
(Conditions 3 and 4). 
Stereotype threat has already been shown to negatively impact test-taking 
performance among members of a number of stigmatized groups (Deaux et al. 2007; 
Mayer and Hanges 2003; O’Brien and Crandall 2003; Gonzales et al. 2002;  Blascovich et 
al. 2001; Quinn and Spencer 2001; Spencer et al. 1999).  Given that ADHD fits the scope 
conditions for stereotype threat coupled with Steele’s predictions that stereotype threat 
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could emerge among members of any group subject to negative stereotypes (Steele 
1997), I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: Among participants with ADHD, those explicitly exposed to 
stereotype threat (Condition 2) will obtain lower average scores on GRE 
questions than those not explicitly exposed to stereotype threat (Condition 1). 
People with ADHD are expected to suffer the additional pressure of being in a 
stereotype threat situation, where the label that has been applied to them (and they have 
accepted) implies poorer performance in a domain-relevant, difficult performance 
situation.  In contrast, people without ADHD exposed to stereotype threat based on 
ADHD should be unaffected, as the label does not apply to them. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: Participants with ADHD who are explicitly exposed to stereotype 
threat (Condition 2) will obtain lower average scores on GRE questions than 
participants without ADHD explicitly exposed to ADHD-based stereotype threat 
(Condition 4). 
Thus, in general, it is hypothesized that the highest score averages will come 
from respondents who are not diagnosed with ADHD and for whom stereotype threat is 
not explicitly invoked, and the lowest score average will come from participants 
diagnosed with ADHD and for whom stereotype threat is explicitly invoked.   
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Sample 
The full sample consisted of 114 participants.  Table 5 provides descriptive 
statistics for the sample used in the study’s analyses:
  
Table 5: Study 2 Sample Descriptive Statistics  
                   Full Sample (n = 114)  ADHD Participants (n = 53)  Non-ADHD Participants (n = 61) 
                    Mean/ Standard  Mean/  Standard  Mean/  Standard  
               Proportion Deviation  Proportion  Deviation  Proportion  Deviation 
Age                   25.31 7.31  28.51  8.54  22.52  4.51  
Female                   .6053 .4910  .5472  .5025  .6557  .4791 
Race 
White                   .5263 .5015  .6792  .4712  .3934  .4926 
Black/African American                 .1754 .3820  .1887  .3950  .1639  .3733 
Asian                   .1842 .3894  .0377  .1924  .3115  .4669 
Multiracial                                  .0789 .2708  .0566  .2333  .0984  .3003 
Other                   .0263 .1608  .0377  .1924  .0164  .1280  
Hispanic                   .0614 .2411  .0566  .2333  .0656  .2496 
Education 
Less than High School Diploma                               .0088 .0937  .0189  .1374  0.000  0.000 
High School Diploma/GED                 .1140 .3193  .0377  .1924  .1803  .3877 
Some College/Vocational School                                     .5263 .5015  .5660  .5004  .4918  .5041  
Bachelor’s Degree                 .1667 .3743  .2264  .4225  .1148  .3214 
Some Graduate School                                      .0702 .2566  .0377  .1924  .0984  .3003 
Graduate or Professional Degree                                     .1140 .3193  .1132  .3199  .1148  .3214  
Importance of Obtaining a High  
Score the GRE Test 
Very important                 .0965 .2966  .1698  .3791  .0328  .1796 
Somewhat important                                     .4298 .4972  .4528  .5025  .4098  .4959 
Neither important nor  
unimportant                 .3596 .4820  .3208  .4712  .3934  .4926 
Somewhat unimportant                .0439 .2057  0.000  0.000  .0820  .2766 
Not important at all                 .0702 .2566  .0566  .2333  .0820  .2766 
Experimental Condition 
1- ADHD/No Stereotype Threat                     .2281 .4214  .4906  .5047  
2- ADHD/Stereotype Threat                .2368 .4270  .5094  .5047 
3- No ADHD/No Stereotype Threat              .2719 .4469      .5082  .5041  
4- No ADHD/Stereotype Threat                    .2632 .4423      .4918  .5041  
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On average, participants were approximately 25 years of age, with about 61% 
being women and 39% being men.  Regarding race and ethnicity, approximately 53% 
identified as white, 18% black or African American, 18% Asian, 8% multiracial, and 3% 
some other race, with about 6% of participants identifying as Hispanic.  Approximately 
1% of participants had less than a high school diploma, while approximately 11% has a 
high school diploma or GED, 53% had completed some college or vocational school, 17% 
had a bachelor’s degree, 7% had completed some graduate school, and 11% had a 
graduate or professional degree.  Participants were fairly evenly distributed into 
experimental conditions, with approximately 23% in Condition 1 (ADHD, no stereotype 
threat), 24% in Condition 2 (ADHD, stereotype threat), 27% in Condition 3 (no ADHD, 
no stereotype threat), and 26% in Condition 4 (no ADHD, stereotype threat).   
Compared with Non-ADHD participants, ADHD participants were 
approximately 6 years older on average (28.51 vs. 22.52).  A smaller percentage of 
ADHD participants were female than non ADHD participants (approximately 55% vs. 
66%).  Regarding race, compared with non-ADHD participants, there were substantially 
more white ADHD participants (approximately 68% vs. 39%), slightly more 
black/African-American participants (approximately 19% vs. 16%), substantially fewer 
Asian participants (approximately 4% vs. 31%), slightly fewer multiracial participants 
(approximately 6% vs. 10%), and slightly more participants who identified themselves 
as being of some other race (approximately 4% vs. 2%).  As for ethnicity, slightly fewer 
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ADHD participants identified as Hispanic (approximately 6% vs. 7%).  Finally, 
regarding education, slightly more ADHD participants had less than a high school 
diploma (2% vs. 0%), substantially fewer had a high school diploma or GED (4% vs. 
18%), more had attended some college or a vocational school (57% vs. 49%), 
substantially more had a bachelor’s degree (23% vs. 11%), fewer had attended some 
graduate school (4%  vs. 10%), and a similar percentage had completed a graduate or 
professional degree (11% vs. 11%).    
To determine relevance of the test-taking procedure to the participants, after 
completion of the study participants answered the question (among other post-study 
questions) of how important achieving a high score on the experimental GRE questions 
used in the study was to them.  Of the participants with ADHD, 9 (17%) indicated that it 
was very important, 24 (45%) somewhat important, 17 (32%) neither important nor 
unimportant, 0 (0%) somewhat unimportant, and 3 (6%) not important at all.  Thus, most 
ADHD participants cared about doing well on the GRE questions.  (In comparison, of 
participants without ADHD, 2 (3%) indicated that it was very important, 25 (41%) 
somewhat important, 24 (39%) neither important nor unimportant, 5 (8%) somewhat 
unimportant, and 5 (8%) not important at all.)   
3.4.2 Analyses 
Table 6 provides mean scores for the verbal and quantitative GRE sections.  On 
the verbal section, participants with ADHD who were not exposed to stereotype threat 
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had the lowest average score (Condition 1, 6.62 out of 15), followed by participants with 
ADHD exposed to stereotype threat (Condition 2, 6.81 out of 15), participants without 
ADHD who were not exposed to stereotype threat (Condition 3, 8.00 out of 15), and 
participants without ADHD who were exposed to ADHD-based stereotype threat 
(Condition 4, 8.43 out of 15).  On the quantitative section, participants with ADHD who 
were exposed to stereotype threat had the lowest average score (Condition 2, 4.19 out of 
14), followed by participants with ADHD not exposed to stereotype threat (Condition 1, 
5.54 out of 14), participants without ADHD who were not exposed to stereotype threat 
(Condition 3, 8.06 out of 14), and participants without ADHD who were exposed to 
ADHD-based stereotype threat (Condition 4, 9.43 out of 14). 
   
  
Table 6:  Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) on GRE sections 
 
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 4 ADHD Participants Non-ADHD Participants 
  -ADHD -ADHD -No ADHD -No ADHD 
  -No  -Stereotype -No   -Stereotype  
  Stereotype Threat  Stereotype Threat 
  Threat    Threat 
 
Verbal  6.62 (3.01) 6.81 (2.65) 8.00 (2.61) 8.43 (2.56) 6.72 (2.80)  8.21 (2.57)  
Quantitative 5.54 (3.36) 4.19 (3.52) 8.06 (3.10) 9.43 (3.05) 4.85 (3.48)  8.74 (3.12) 
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Hypothesis 1 posits that, on average, participants with ADHD will achieve lower 
scores on GRE questions than participants without ADHD.  Table 7 compares ADHD 
participants with non-ADHD participants on verbal and quantitative GRE scores.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, participants with ADHD achieved significantly lower 
scores on average than participants without ADHD on the verbal section (6.72 vs. 8.21, p 
<.001) and on the quantitative section (4.85 vs. 8.74, p <.001).   
 
Table 7:  Comparing ADHD Participants with Non-ADHD Participants: Mean Scores 
(and Standard Deviations) and Significance Test Results on GRE Sections (n = 114) 
  Condition 1 Condition 2 Non-ADHD Participants 
  -ADHD -ADHD 
  -No  -Stereotype 
  Stereotype Threat 
  Threat 
 
Verbal  6.62 (3.01)** 6.81 (2.65)** 8.21 (2.57) 
Quantitative 5.54 (3.36)*** 4.19 (3.52)*** 8.74 (3.12) 
 
*** = Significantly different from non-ADHD participants in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p 
< .001 
** = Significantly different from non-ADHD participants in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < 
.01 
* = Significantly different from non-ADHD participants in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < 
.05 
 
Hypothesis 2 postulates that, among participants with ADHD, those who are 
explicitly exposed to stereotype threat will obtain lower average scores on GRE 
questions than those not explicitly exposed to stereotype threat.  Inconsistent with 
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Hypothesis 2, Table 8 reveals no significant difference in the average verbal section 
scores of ADHD participants exposed to stereotype threat (Condition 2, 6.81) and 
ADHD participants not exposed to stereotype threat (Condition 1, 6.62).  However, on 
average, ADHD-affected participants exposed to stereotype threat (Condition 2) 
achieved significantly lower scores on the quantitative section (4.19 vs. 5.54, p <.05) than 
ADHD-affected participants who were not exposed to stereotype threat (Condition 1).  
Thus, the data reveal partial evidence that stereotype threat diminishes test-taking 
performance among persons with ADHD. 
 
Table 8:  Exposure to Stereotype Threat among ADHD Participants: Mean Scores (and 
Standard Deviations) and Significance Test Results on GRE Sections (n = 53) 
   
Condition 1 Condition 2  
  -ADHD -ADHD 
  -No  -Stereotype 
  Stereotype Threat 
  Threat 
 
Verbal  6.62 (3.01) 6.81 (2.65)  
Quantitative 5.54 (3.36) 4.19 (3.52)*  
*** = Significantly different from Condition 1 in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < .001 
** = Significantly different from Condition 1 participants in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < 
.01 
* = Significantly different from Condition 1 participants in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < 
.05 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 conjectures that participants with ADHD who are explicitly 
exposed to stereotype threat will obtain lower average scores on GRE questions than 
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participants who have not been diagnosed with ADHD and who are assigned to 
conditions explicitly designed to invoke stereotype threat in persons with ADHD.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, Table 9 reveals that participants with ADHD who were 
explicitly exposed to stereotype threat (Condition 2) obtained lower average scores on 
the verbal section (6.81 vs. 8.43, p < .001) and the quantitative section (4.19 vs. 9.43, p < 
.001) than participants without ADHD who were exposed to ADHD-based stereotype 
threat (Condition 4).   
 
Table 9:  Comparing Exposure to Stereotype Threat among ADHD and Non-ADHD 
Participants: Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) and Significance Test Results on 
GRE Sections (n = 57) 
  Condition 2 Condition 4  
  -ADHD -No ADHD 
  -Stereotype -Stereotype 
  Threat  Threat 
 
Verbal  6.81 (2.65) 8.43 (2.56)***  
Quantitative 4.19 (3.52) 9.43 (3.05)***  
 
*** = Significantly different from Condition 2 in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < .001 
** = Significantly different from Condition 2 participants in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < 
.01 
* = Significantly different from Condition 2 participants in the predicted direction with a t-test producing a one-tailed p < 
.05 
 
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that ADHD is negatively associated with verbal 
and quantitative test-taking performance.  Persons with ADHD perform even worse on 
quantitative questions when exposed to stereotype threat.  Finally, the stereotype threat 
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manipulation only affects those who are predicted to be impacted by it (persons with 
ADHD) and has no significant negative effect on persons without ADHD. 
Given the high education level of the sample, the aforementioned analyses posed 
the potential to provide a conservative estimate of mental illness-based stereotype threat 
in the completion of the quantitative GRE section, as ADHD participants may have been 
particularly high-functioning in this sample.  To account for education, two ANOVA 
tests were conducted with quantitative GRE score as the dependent variable and ADHD 
(yes or no), stereotype threat (yes or no), and the interaction between ADHD and 
stereotype threat as independent variables.  In the first, no covariates were included.  In 
the second, education was included as a covariate.  Consistent with the previous 
analyses, when education was not included as a covariate, ADHD was significantly 
associated with quantitative GRE score (F(1, 104.75) = 9.84, p = .002).  Stereotype threat 
alone was not significant at the .05 level of significance (F(1, 28.57) = 2.68, p = .104), but 
the effect of the interaction between ADHD and stereotype threat on quantitative GRE 
score was barely significant (F(1, 41.90) = 3.94, p = .0498). 
When included, the covariate education was significantly related to quantitative 
GRE performance (F(1, 41.26) = 3.98, p = .049).  With education taken into account, 
results remained consistent with the previous analyses.  The significant effect of ADHD 
on quantitative GRE score (F(1, 98.16) = 9.47, p = .003) remained.  Stereotype threat alone 
was only marginally significant at the .05 level of significance (F (1, 37.57) = 3.62, p = .06), 
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but the effect of the interaction between ADHD and stereotype threat on quantitative 
GRE score remained significant (F(1, 50.91) = 4.91, p = .029).  With education included as 
a covariate, the effect of the interaction between ADHD and stereotype threat on 
quantitative GRE score was actually more significant (p = .029 vs. p = .0498).  (In parallel 
analyses of verbal GRE performance, with education included as a covariate, the effect 
of the interaction between ADHD and stereotype threat on verbal GRE score remained 
insignificant.) 
3.5 Discussion 
This study is the first to specifically address the role of stereotype threat in test-
taking among persons with ADHD.  In doing so, it extends stereotype threat research by 
illuminating whether a domain-relevant mental disorder can serve as a basis for 
stereotype threat, thereby diminishing test performance.  The symptomatology of 
ADHD is directly relevant to test-taking (as attention and focus are important 
components of succeeded on standardized test in a timed environment).  Further, given 
ETS’ history of providing accommodations on standardized tests for ADHD via an 
evaluation process that necessitates proof of academic impairment (such as low 
performance on previous standardized tests), the process of obtaining accommodations 
during the test registration process itself may invoke stereotype threat that impedes 
actual test performance.  Thus, it is important to understand whether or not stereotype 
threat is relevant to persons with ADHD. 
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Consistent with the relevance of ADHD to the test-taking environment, 
participants in this study with ADHD—regardless of condition—performed at a lower 
level than persons without ADHD.  However, over and above the impact of simply 
having ADHD, stereotype threat appeared to further impede the performance of 
persons with ADHD in answering quantitative GRE questions.  As with previous 
research (Quinn et al. 2004), exposure to stereotypes outside of their relevant category 
(in this case, when non-ADHD participants were exposed to circumstances designed to 
create stereotype threat in persons with ADHD) did not impede performance.   
Previous stereotype threat research indicates a number of possible reasons why 
those for whom negative stereotypes about ADHD were relevant were affected as they 
were in completing the quantitative GRE section.  Most simply, the threat of confirming 
negative stereotypes about people with ADHD’s ability to perform effectively may have 
been distracted ADHD-affected participants in the stereotype threat condition from the 
task at hand (Steele and Aronson 1995).  Additionally, those who are exposed to 
stereotype threat may experience a decrease in positive emotions, which inhibits 
functioning (Kang and Chasteen 2009).  Concern with confirming negative stereotypes 
may also lead to individuals’ self-handicapping; Steele and Aronson (1995) found that 
African-American participants in stereotype-threat conditions were more likely to report 
lack of sleep and inability to focus.  Although not specifically tested for in this study, 
certain actions, such as intentionally neglecting to take medication to relieve the 
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symptoms of ADHD, could function as self-handicapping mechanisms specific to 
persons with ADHD.   
Many other potential mechanisms have either not found evidence or been 
inconsistently supported.  Thus far, evidence has failed to support claims that persons 
might shut down and exert less effort or put too much effort in and burn-out in response 
to stereotype threat (Smith 2004).  Similarly, evaluation apprehension (or concern by 
participants that poor performance on the task will lead others to look down on them) 
and perceptions of the test itself as unfair have failed to garner evidentiary support as 
mediators (Smith 2004).  The evidence regarding anxiety’s role as a mediator in the 
relationship between stereotype threat and performance is mixed; some researchers 
have found no mediation (e.g., Keller and Dauenheimer 2003; Gonzales et al. 2002), 
while others have found partial mediation (Osborne 2001).  However, other potential 
mechanisms may have underpinned the impact of stereotype threat evidenced in this 
study at pre-perceptual or psychophysiological levels (Spenner et al. 2004). 
Whatever the relevant mechanism or set of mechanisms, this study reveals that 
stereotype threat, in addition to impeding performance on so many other bases, has 
relevance to ADHD.  Coupled with existing evidence regarding general mental illness 
and history of depression as triggers for stereotype threat (Quinn et al. 2004), this study 
provides confirmatory information suggesting that stereotype threat may pose problems 
both at the broad conceptual level (pertaining to general stereotypes about mental 
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illness) and at the diagnosis-specific level (pertaining to particular mental disorder 
labels).  Stereotype threat poses a serious concern, then, for those impacted by mental 
illness insofar as it impedes test-taking performance, potentially negatively influencing 
future educational and vocational prospects.  This is particularly true given that 
stereotype threat in specific task situations can have spillover effects, depleting self-
control resources needed for other related or unrelated life challenges (Inzlicht et al. 
2011).   
3.5.1 Limitations 
Despite this study’s contributions, it is not without limitations.  There are a 
number of reasons why this may represent a conservative test of stereotype threat.  First, 
given the difficulty of recruiting participants with ADHD, 31 of the 53 participants with 
ADHD (13 in Condition 1, the non-stereotype threat condition and 18 in Condition 2, the 
stereotype threat condition) were recruited directly using the recruitment text indicating 
that researchers were looking for participants with ADHD, as such individuals were 
generally not included in tests of experimental GRE questions.  This direct form of 
recruitment may have resulted in a more conservative test of the difference between the 
stereotype threat and non-stereotype threat ADHD conditions, as participants in 
Condition 1 may have been implicitly impacted by stereotype threat through the 
attention to their disorder raised by the form of recruitment used.  Although recruitment 
was typically detached from actual participation in the study by several days and 
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emphasis was placed on the study as a test of experimental GRE questions, some 
participants did refer the study as the “ADHD study” in correspondence.  Recruitment 
using only indirect methods may have yielded stronger support for the presence of 
stereotype threat based on ADHD status.    
Additionally, this may have been a conservative tests of stereotype threat for 
other reasons.  It is possible that ADHD participants in the non-stereotype threat 
condition experienced some indirect stereotype threat by virtue of the test-taking 
situation or due to the actual effects of their disorder.  Finally, the sample for this study 
was highly educated on average (both in general and among its ADHD participants 
specifically).  This being the case, the ADHD participants in this sample may have been 
uncharacteristically high-achieving or have already found ways to at least partially 
mitigate their test-taking deficits at least enough to successfully enter higher education.  
A sample with lower education might have yielded a stronger contrast between those 
ADHD participants who were explicitly exposed to stereotype threat and those who 
were not. 
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4. Perception is Everything 
“Some colleagues rebelled against the nomenclature change, saying that a vote of 
hands should not determine psychiatric diagnosis, forgetting that it was a vote of hands 
that put [a psychiatric diagnosis] on the list of disorders in the first place.” – Charles 
Silverstein (Silverstein 2009:1). 
4.1 Summary 
Perception is everything.  Take for example, homosexuality.  Greek philosopher 
Plato (2001) suggested that homosexual love represented the purest and highest 
aspiration.  Homosexuality was a mental disorder according to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders II until its 6th printing.  Then, in 1973, it was 
replaced by “sexual orientation disturbance,” which indicated that the real psychiatric 
condition was not homosexuality itself but rather dissatisfaction and distress stemming 
from unwanted homosexual feelings and behavior (The American Psychiatric 
Association 1973).  Is homosexuality, then, the pinnacle of human triumph, a deviant 
mental illness, or a run-of-the-mill part of humanity that can simply be problematic if 
unwanted by the person experiencing it?  The same definitional confusion applies to 
many sets of behaviors which have at one point or another become labeled as mental 
illnesses.  Who gets labeled as mentally ill and how they are treated is a perceptional 
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moving target.  Yet, despite the subjectivity, labels have real consequences for the 
labeled.   
Life is a series of often-simultaneous opportunities and challenges.  For persons 
with symptomatology consistent with mental illness, that symptomatology may 
complicate rising to the occasion when opportunity knocks or challenges arise.  Even
worse, putting a name to the added difficulties of being mentally ill potentially opens 
one up to scrutiny and scorn.  Complicatedly, often the best opportunity for relief from 
the symptoms that plague the mentally ill is to turn to the modern medical 
establishment wherein one hand writes the prescriptions while the other heats up the 
branding iron (Conrad 2007).1 
This dissertation focused on the impact of perceptions of mental illness at two 
important points along the path of productive adulthood: 1) during the test-taking 
process (a precursor to academic opportunity and, through academic opportunity, 
vocational success); and 2) during participation in goal-oriented, group-based activities 
such as the ones which permeate the modern employment sector.  In the latter case, 
Study 1 extended research in the status characteristics theory tradition to determine how 
specific mental illness labels (GAD, MDD, ADHD, and schizophrenia) are perceived in 
work-group situations in terms of stigma and status attributions.  In the former case,
                                                     
1 This is not to say that the medical establishment intends harm, but a wound inflicted with the best of 
intentions is still a wound. 
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Study 2 extended existing work on stereotype threat to a task-relevant mental illness: 
ADHD. 
Despite what previous theorization and empirical evidence on the stigma of 
mental illness would lead one to expect (e.g., Lucas and Phelan 2012; Wahl 1999; Penn 
and Martin 1998; Angermeyer and Matschinger 1997; Link 1987; Schur 1971; Becker 
1963; Goffman 1963), on average, participants in Study 1 who believed they were 
working with a partner with mental illness did not choose the same partner at a 
significantly lower rate than participants in the control condition chose the same partner 
for future collaboration.  Nor did participants who believed they were working with 
someone with a mental illness indicate that they wanted to work with their partners less, 
had less in common with their partners, or saw their partners as less considerate, 
pleasant, powerful, likeable, or cooperative than participants in the control condition 
indicated about their partners.  The one exception was that persons whose partners 
allegedly had ADHD considered them significantly less pleasant than control condition 
participants viewed their own partners.  Taken together with previous work (Lucas and 
Phelan 2012), the substantive conclusion is that, while mental illness may prompt 
stigmatizing perceptions in task-group situations when the severity is high (e.g., mental 
illness required hospitalization for 12 months), the suggestion that specific mental illness 
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labels detached from conceptualizations of severity may invite different types of 
stigmatization is unsupported. 
Regarding status attributions, Study 1 provided limited evidence that ADHD 
and, to a lesser extent, MDD may function as status characteristics differentiated from 
those who do not have a mental illness label.  When given the opportunity to change 
their answer to that of their partner’s answer, participants who believed that their 
partner had MDD or ADHD changed their answers less often (8.64 times and 8.40 times 
respectively vs. 10.42 times in the control condition, p < .05).  Participants with MDD or 
ADHD-labeled partners also thought their group performed less well than participants 
in the control group (with scores of 50.93 out of 100 and 53.33 respectively vs. 62.33, p < 
.05).  Moreover, participants who believed that their partner had ADHD considered 
their partner to be less respected (55.20 out of 100 vs. 68.83 in the control condition) and 
less knowledgeable (56.27 out of 100 vs. 67.50 in the control condition).  The most 
negatively evaluated mental illness label also was the one which was most task relevant, 
as the problems used for evaluation involved rectangles appearing for a short period of 
time and then disappearing quickly—something which could have been seen as 
problematic for a partner with ADHD.  Although the clustering of significant, negative 
status attributions within the ADHD condition may demonstrate the impact of task 
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relevance in status attribution, the relatively small number of significant findings overall 
may suggest that the findings for MDD and ADHD are at least partially attributable to 
chance.   
Study 2 provides evidence that the label of ADHD—over and above the 
symptomatology of the mental illness underlying it—may negatively impact test-taking 
ability via stereotype threat.  Participants with ADHD who were told that persons with 
ADHD performed worse on GRE questions than those without ADHD prior to 
answering GRE questions achieved lower scores on quantitative questions than persons 
with ADHD not exposed to stereotype threat.   
Taken together, these findings indicate that perception of mental illness labels is 
an important component of stigmatization and status attribution but that perception 
may rely on relevance of the label to the domain in which it is being evaluated.  Study 1 
showed partial evidence that status attribution may not necessarily arise on the basis of 
specific mental illness labels if such labels are not domain relevant (given the negative 
status attributions appearing for ADHD but not as much for MDD and not at all for 
GAD and schizophrenia).  In parallel, Study 2 provided evidence consistent with the 
argument that internalized perceptions of a domain-relevant disorder (ADHD in a test-
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taking situation) can result in a self-stigmatizing process that diminishes scores via 
stereotype threat. 
4.2 Limitations 
While Study 1 and Study 2 expand on previous work in useful ways, they are 
hampered by certain limitations.  In Study 1, a large number of participants needed to be 
excluded from the sample due to either not believing that they were working with real 
partners or failing to pay sufficient attention during the study (as measured by their 
encountering a question asking them to respond by moving a slider bar to a specific 
number and not sliding the bar to that number). This raises questions about who remained 
in the final sample.  Although participants were randomly assigned to conditions, the 
removal of over half of the participants for the aforementioned data quality issues could 
be problematic if the remaining participants shared characteristics atypical of the sample 
overall that might have altered the results.  For example, are those who remained the sort 
of people who were so willing to go along with the experiment that they would also 
demonstrate social desirability bias more frequently when making stigma and status-
based attributions about their partners?   
As for Study 2, the need to switch from indirect recruitment of persons with 
ADHD (by ascertaining their status from a question embedded in a lengthy pre-study 
questionnaire) to direct recruitment (by asking people with ADHD to participate in the 
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study) may have made participants think the study was about ADHD and test-taking 
performance.  This may have been the case even though the indirect recruitment text 
clarified that the attempt to include persons with ADHD was made to increase 
demographic diversity in a study that was actually about testing experimental GRE 
questions.  Given that simply providing one’s race as an African American can diminish 
test performance (Steele 2010), if some of the participants with ADHD went into the 
study believing that it was about ADHD, that knowledge may have indirectly cued 
stereotype threat.  If so, then Study 2 would actually represent a rather conservative test 
of stereotype threat, as there could be some individuals in the non-stereotype threat 
condition who were negatively impacted in a way that could affect their test performance.   
Although these limitations are undesirable, even if large numbers of participants 
did not need to be eliminated from the analytic sample, the major benefit might arguably 
have been greater statistical power.  That is, given the recruitment strategy for the study, 
the sample could not have been viewed as representative of the general population.  This 
is also true for Study 2.  Thus, the external validity of the two studies would inevitably 
have been questionable.   
4.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
This dissertation raises a number of questions worthy of further consideration.  
Lucas and Phelan’s (2012) study focused on perceptions of a partner in a task group 
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situation thought to have been hospitalized for 12 months for psychological problems, 
while Study 1 of this dissertation replaced the overly general label of psychological 
problems with specific illness labels while omitting the severity implied by a lengthy 
hospitalization.   The intermediate scenario has not been explored; what if individuals 
are told that they are working with partners who have specific mental illness labels like 
GAD, MDD, ADHD, or schizophrenia, do their stigma and status attributions of the 
partner change if the severity of the partner’s illness is provided?  Additionally, it makes 
sense that, given the task relevance of ADHD in Study 1, there were more negative 
status characteristics attributed to partners with ADHD.   However, this finding requires 
replication.   If the symptomatology of illness labels which did not provoke any negative 
status attributions (in this case, GAD and schizophrenia) were more relevant to the task, 
would negative status attributions emerge?  (In other words, when mental illness labels 
are specified, is a given label more likely to be negatively evaluated in a task situation if 
diagnostically likely to impede group performance?)  Finally, previous research and 
Study 1 do not take into account the potentially mitigating role of medication on 
perceptions of mental illness.  Could knowing that a partner with a task-relevant mental 
illness was taking medication that was effectively combating his or her symptoms 
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reduce participants’ negative status attributions?  These questions require further 
attention. 
Study 2 provides partial evidence that ADHD may function as a basis for 
stereotype threat.  Previous work found that depression can also function in this way, 
whereas eating disorders did not trigger stereotype threat (Quinn et al. 2004).  This is 
interesting given that other bases of stereotype threat (such as race, gender, and class) 
have yielded more consistent results across sub-types (e.g., stereotype threat impacts 
both men and women rather than just one group or the other) (Deaux et al. 2007; Mayer 
and Hanges 2003; O’Brien and Crandall 2003; Gonzales et al. 2002;  Blascovich et al. 
2001; Quinn and Spencer 2001; Spencer et al. 1999).  The difference in this case may be 
the relevance of symptomatology to the task.  Future research should consider which 
specific mental illnesses can lead to stereotype threat and what circumstances are 
necessary for stereotype threat to occur for persons with specific mental illnesses. 
Much remains unexplained or insufficiently understood, but of one thing we can 
be sure; if history is a valid predictor of the future, people will always find a way to 
categorize each other on the basis of perceptions of normality or abnormality.  
Medicalization, though important, is but one means of doing so.  Regardless of the 
mechanism by which differentiation occurs, we must better understand and adapt to the 
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repercussions of putting ourselves in boxes and placing some boxes on top of others 
whether in pursuit of a job, in furtherance of the activities pursuant to employment, or 
other important facets of human existence.   
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